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The return of the English Question
• From Gladstone onwards, attempts to introduce 
devolution to parts of the UK have provoked counter-
claims that the interests of the other parts needed 
compensatory protection at Westminster. The focus 
particularly shifted to England’s interests in the 1970s, 
when proposals for devolution were bedevilled by the 
notorious ‘West Lothian Question’. Yet attempts to 
provide such compensatory protection ran into  
serious difficulties.
• Following the implementation of devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1990s, these 
earlier debates re-emerged. A series of proposals 
from within the Conservative party were developed, 
culminating in the recommendations of the independent 
McKay Commission in 2013. In many cases, these 
proposals were presented as precautionary adjustments 
to avoid English resentment and protect the union.
• The anomaly that these proposals sought to address 
concerned the possibility that legislation affecting only 
England could be passed by parliament without the 
support of England’s democratic representatives. This 
happened after devolution on votes concerning tuition 
fees and foundation hospitals.
• Evidence suggests growing irritation among many of the 
English at England’s constitutional position, including 
about its representation at Westminster. The most 
popular solution for addressing this has consistently 
been to reform Commons voting arrangements to give 
greater priority to English MPs.
• In addition to these factors, there has also been 
suspicion that the introduction of EVEL by David 
Cameron’s government was motivated by party  
self-interest. This has left a legacy in terms of the 
legitimacy of the reform, which has so far failed to  
attract the cross-party support necessary for it to 
become widely accepted.
The new EVEL procedures explained
• The EVEL procedures primarily affect the scrutiny of 
legislation in the House of Commons. They give English 
(or English and Welsh) MPs the opportunity to veto entire 
bills, or clauses of bills, that relate exclusively to that part 
of the UK. EVEL does not provide English (or English and 
Welsh) MPs with sole control over English (or English and 
Welsh) legislation. Nor does it change procedure in the 
House of Lords.
• The decision about whether EVEL applies on a particular 
piece of legislation is taken by the Commons Speaker. 
This is known as ‘certification’. To be certified, the relevant 
unit of legislation must meet both elements of a two-part 
test: it applies exclusively to the area in question; and it 
would be within the power of a devolved legislature in 
another part of the UK to make equivalent provision.
• The most important characteristic of the EVEL reform is 
that it implements a ‘double veto’ right. This means that 
certified legislation must be supported by a majority of 
both English (or English and Welsh) and UK-wide MPs 
to pass into law. Under the double veto principle, it is 
therefore not possible for English (or English and Welsh) 
MPs to force through legislation against the wishes of the 
whole House.
Evaluating EVEL
• Different justifications have been offered for the 
introduction of EVEL, and various types of criticism 
registered against it.
• There are broadly two types of rationale for it: first, as 
a pragmatic response to new territorial pressures; and 
second, as a commitment to the principle of procedural 
equality between the four parts of the UK. These 
justifications are not mutually exclusive, and proponents 
frequently employ both. But they are nevertheless 
different, and point in subtly different directions in terms 
of the form that EVEL should take.
• The government itself has not been entirely consistent in its 
arguments for EVEL. While the government’s reform can be 
understood as broadly consistent with the first justification, 
ministers have at times also employed arguments and 
language more closely associated with the second. This 
tendency to ‘over claim’ may present problems for public 
understanding of the reform, as well as difficulties when 
expectations of its effect are not met.
Executive summary
Recent political developments have focused attention on the ‘English Question’. In response 
to the 2014 Scottish referendum result, the UK government initiated a procedural reform in the 
House of Commons known as ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (EVEL), which was formally 
adopted in October 2015.
This report results from an in-depth academic research project into EVEL. It evaluates how the 
procedures fared during their first year in operation, and weighs arguments for and against 
such a reform. Based on this analysis, it makes a series of constructive proposals to improve 
the current system.
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• Five important criticisms of EVEL are evaluated, and 
empirical data about how EVEL operated during its first 
12 months is offered.
• The first criticism is that EVEL will politicise the office 
of the Speaker. This concern focuses primarily on the 
potential for the Speaker’s certification decisions to be 
contested by MPs. Based on the first year of EVEL’s 
operation, there is little evidence that this has happened. 
The Speaker has also taken a significant number of 
decisions that conflict with the advice provided by 
government, thus underscoring his independence.
• A second criticism is that EVEL creates two classes 
of MP, and that this not only undermines the status of 
those from outside England (or England and Wales) but 
also inhibits their ability to represent their constituents 
on legislation that legally applies only in England (or 
England and Wales) despite having consequential effects 
elsewhere. As a point of principle, it seems reasonable to 
treat direct effects differently from indirect ones. But even 
where legislation certified as England-only has indirect 
effects in other parts of the UK – for example through the 
‘Barnett consequentials’ – the double veto means that 
MPs from those affected territories are in no weaker a 
position under EVEL to block it.
• A third criticism is the claim that EVEL will undermine the 
coherence of UK-wide government. This criticism would 
be particularly relevant in the event that a UK government 
did not have a majority in England (or England and 
Wales). In such circumstances, much would depend 
on how the main parties responded to this new political 
situation. But it seems plausible that a UK government 
would be able to bargain with English (or English and 
Welsh) MPs in many foreseeable circumstances.
• A fourth criticism is that EVEL fails to facilitate 
expression of England’s voice in parliament. The 
government’s reform effectively conflates expression 
of England’s voice with its capacity to apply a veto, 
but parliaments and legislatures fulfil other functions 
than merely voting on legislation. During EVEL’s first 
year of operation, its mechanisms have not noticeably 
enhanced England’s voice.
• A fifth criticism of EVEL is that it is unhelpfully complex 
and opaque in character. The primary cause of this 
complexity is the substantive design of the system, 
including the new stages and processes it establishes, 
but the standing orders that underpin them have 
also been criticised for their overly legalistic drafting. 
Complexity may undermine EVEL’s capacity to achieve 
its goal of addressing English grievance and, if certified 
legislation becomes the subject of territorial conflict, this 
complexity may prove destabilising.
Improving EVEL
• Drawing on the broader analysis above, several options 
are discussed with the aim of improving EVEL.
• Greater priority should be given to facilitating England’s 
voice, in addition to providing a veto right on legislation. 
While this could, in principle, be achieved through further 
changes within the legislative process, it would be better 
to separate voice from veto and to encourage voice 
outside the legislative process. Potential mechanisms for 
enhancing the voice of English MPs include an English 
grand committee (but with a remit that extends beyond 
legislation) and an English Affairs select committee. Both 
would be broadly consistent with Westminster’s existing 
procedural mechanisms.
• The double veto should be further entrenched. Two 
elements of the EVEL processes do not appear to be 
consistent with the double veto principle: consideration 
of instruments subject to the negative procedure, and 
the Commons’ consideration of certain types of Lords 
amendment. Given the centrality of the double veto to 
the integrity of this reform, these two anomalies should 
be rectified.
• The complexity of EVEL should be reduced. A menu of 
five broad options for simplification is presented. Two of 
these seek to avoid EVEL stages from being triggered 
unless necessary: either by activating EVEL on fewer 
bills; or by eliminating the automatic requirement to 
convene the legislative grand committee stages (at 
which the English, or English and Welsh, veto may 
be applied). Two further options seek to reduce the 
complexity of the process itself: by reducing the number 
of veto points; and by no longer certifying certain types 
of provision, notably legislative amendments.  
A final option is to consolidate the standing orders 
that underpin the EVEL process.
• Further steps should be taken to improve the legitimacy 
of EVEL, including: renaming the procedure to better 
signal its purpose; and initiating new cross-party 
discussions on the reform. The system should be 
made as transparent as possible, including through the 
provision of clearer and more consistent information 
about certification. Separately, the Speaker should 
consider giving public explanations for his certification 
decisions where they are requested. Further review of this 
system should be conducted, both before the end of the 
current parliament and beyond.
Conclusion and recommendations
• A full list of recommendations is given in the final chapter 
of this report.
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The referendum on Scottish independence, in September 2014, 
brought to a head a steadily growing concern among many 
English voters about the implications of the post-devolution 
settlement for England, propelling to the forefront of British 
politics the question of what the English might now want in 
constitutional terms. It also breathed new life into a debate 
about whether the English are developing a form of nationalism 
that breaks from older styles of British patriotism and affiliation, 
and which requires some form of constitutional expression. 
The promise of new powers for Scotland, made in the fraught 
final weeks of the campaign, confirmed in the minds of many 
the conviction that the British state was increasingly inclined 
towards the sensibilities and interests of its minority nations 
rather than the English. David Cameron, in his response to 
the result on the steps of Downing Street, committed his 
government to reforming Westminster’s voting arrangements to 
give greater priority to the English. In so doing, he became the 
most senior British politician to acknowledge and respond to 
the shifting pattern of English national sentiments.
For some observers, this emergent nationalism was one of the 
key dynamics at work in the vote for Brexit that followed in June 
2016. During the campaign, some groups of English voters 
were seen to be amenable to the call to ‘take back control’ in 
a context where England itself lacked mechanisms for political 
and institutional sovereignty. Given the widespread belief that 
a developing sense of English nationalism may have played a 
role in shaping the referendum’s outcome, the different faces 
of the English Question are likely to remain salient for some 
considerable while. Yet, Brexit aside, there has been a notable 
growth of interest in recent years in the question of whether 
England should be offered devolution, in keeping with its sister 
countries, and the accompanying debate about whether this 
should take the form of decentralisation within England or 
some form of deal to England as a whole.
These developments and debates represent an important 
backdrop to the particular issue with which this report 
is concerned: the introduction in October 2015 by the 
Conservative government of new rules in the House of 
Commons known as ‘English Votes for English Laws’ 
(hereafter EVEL). The reform gives English (and English and 
Welsh) MPs a veto over legislation that applies only in that 
part of the UK.1 As we will see, the government’s aims in 
introducing these procedures have not always been entirely 
consistent, but the most common and widely understood 
justification for EVEL is that it is designed to answer the so-
called ‘West Lothian Question’. This conundrum is closely 
related to the key concerns signalled by the English Question, 
and references the anomaly whereby MPs representing 
constituencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
may vote at Westminster on policy matters that affect only 
Introduction
One of the most striking outcomes of the dramatic political and constitutional events that  
have taken place in the UK since the Scottish referendum has been the sudden, unforeseen, 
re-emergence of the ‘English Question’. Misleadingly labelled as a single question, the phrase 
signals several distinct queries about the governance and constitutional position of England in 
the era after devolution.
England, whereas English representatives may no longer vote 
on matters that have been devolved to one of those territories.
In this report we provide a rigorous evaluation of these new 
procedural rules. Our analysis results from an in-depth 
academic research project into the implementation of EVEL, 
conducted at the Mile End Institute at Queen Mary University 
of London, and supported by the Centre on Constitutional 
Change and the Economic and Social Research Council. 
Much of our research has focused on the detailed design and 
working of EVEL, for which we have carried out exhaustive 
analysis of parliamentary records and conducted interviews 
with a range of politicians, officials, and other experts and 
authorities. Drawing on this, the report presents summary 
data on how EVEL operated during its first 12 months of 
operation.2 But this report is not merely a technical evaluation. 
We also consider the main arguments for and against the 
procedures, and seek to offer a wider perspective on them in 
the light of the re-emergence of the English Question, asking 
what they mean for the UK’s constitutional system at a time 
when it is under considerable strain. Based on this analysis, 
we make a series of constructive proposals setting out ways 
in which the current version of EVEL might be improved.
The report is presented in four chapters. We begin, in chapter 
1, by placing the government’s EVEL reform in wider historical 
context. As we will see, the idea that devolution elsewhere 
presents dilemmas for England is not new. Over the past 
century or more, various schemes have been devised and 
abandoned to address these dilemmas, but it is since the 
devolution settlements of the late 1990s that considerable 
pressure for change has grown. This overview is intended to 
help us understand how the current version of EVEL emerged. 
Chapter 2 then presents a basic overview of the EVEL process 
introduced by David Cameron’s government. Chapter 3 
evaluates these new procedures in depth, sifting both the 
arguments made in support of reform and the most common 
objections to it. It is in this section that we present and draw 
upon empirical data on how EVEL worked during its first year in 
operation. Our central argument is that EVEL can, in principle, 
be justified, and that some of the specific criticisms made of the 
reform are, to a degree, limited by the ‘double veto’ feature of 
the government’s scheme. Nevertheless, we also find that the 
reform suffers from a number of specific flaws – in particular, 
its complexity and opacity, and its conflation of the goals of 
‘voice’ and ‘veto’. Based on this analysis, chapter 4 offers 
some specific proposals for how EVEL should be improved, 
suggesting ways of separating voice and veto, entrenching the 
important double veto, reducing complexity, and improving 
legitimacy. A final chapter then draws conclusions and provides 
a brief list of our main recommendations.
1   Throughout this report, we generally refer to only these two geographical categories. However, in rare circumstances, as described in chapter 2, similar 
provision also exists for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
2   Our data covers the 12-month period from 23 October 2015 (when EVEL came into force) until 22 October 2016.
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EVEL has been dismissed by some as a political gimmick 
designed to respond to partisan political pressures. But, 
while such motives provide part of the explanation for the 
reform, EVEL is also the culmination of over a century of 
debate about how to represent the constituent parts of the 
UK at Westminster in the context of devolution to some of 
its territories. The so-called English Question has long lain 
dormant in British politics. In an unusual, and highly prescient, 
book published in 2006, Robert Hazell (2006:240) correctly 
noted that the question ‘can remain unresolved for as long as 
the English want’. How it moved to the fore of British politics, 
and what we can learn from these earlier debates and trends, 
are important parts of the contemporary context.
The aim of this chapter is to place the current debate over 
EVEL in its wider setting. The chapter is divided into five 
sections. In the first we offer a broad historical perspective, 
showing how, from Gladstone onwards, attempts to introduce 
devolution to parts of the UK have been bedevilled by the 
question of its consequences for Westminster, including 
for English representation. The remaining four sections 
then consider developments during the period after the 
implementation of devolution in the late 1990s. In the 
second section we consider various specific proposals that 
have been made for reform at Westminster. A third section 
discusses how pressure for reform grew, following a small 
number of controversial Commons votes, while the fourth 
looks at how public opinion in England has developed during 
this period. All of these trends fed into the development of 
EVEL under David Cameron’s government, which is the focus 
of the final section of the chapter.
The historical backdrop
The British system of parliamentary government has evolved 
incrementally over centuries and has, in very broad terms, 
developed a distinctive approach to the management of 
the patchwork of territories which the British state has come 
to govern. Put simply, this has involved a statecraft which 
leans towards the granting of strategic concessions to local 
powers in order that the autonomy of the central state, and 
the fundamental character of British rule, be maintained. 
Special arrangements for the governance of its most far-flung 
territories have long been a feature of British history. Despite 
the mythology of the unitary kingdom that prevailed in the 
English heartland, the UK was always a state that worked 
differently and had different relations with its constituent 
peoples, in part because of the differential character of the 
unions it encompassed. And while the English parliament 
ceased formally to exist in 1707, in practice it expanded after 
union with Scotland, absorbing territories from other parts 
of Britain, thus becoming the legislature that served the 
whole of the United Kingdom. Securing the hegemony of 
the state within this expanded territory was premised upon 
the recognition that significant concessions were necessary 
in terms of how the non-English territories were governed. 
These included granting various degrees of autonomy to the 
different peoples within its borders.
Proposals to introduce devolution to Scotland and Wales 
– ultimately realised in 1999 – represented an attempt to 
undercut nationalist ambitions and alleviate disputes between 
London and the peripheries. They were therefore consistent 
with this earlier approach to territorial statecraft. Yet, in the 
wake of devolution’s implementation, the British system of 
representative government became notably more lopsided 
and asymmetrical in character, and another question – 
concerning some form of compensatory or equivalent 
settlement for England – made its way into the political ether. 
This was not the first time that questions about how England 
was to be represented and governed within the British political 
system had become politically contentious. On a number 
of earlier occasions, similar issues had been raised in the 
context of concerns about the implications of devolution for 
the union parliament.
Questions about representation of the four nations at 
Westminster were most notably aired during debates about 
Gladstone’s plans for Irish ‘home rule’. In response to growing 
political unrest in Ireland, Gladstone attempted to introduce 
home rule, giving control of domestic matters to an Irish 
legislature, but retaining the management of foreign affairs 
issues at Westminster. The second of his Home Rule Bills, of 
1893, is particularly pertinent from a contemporary perspective. 
It proposed that the number of Irish MPs at Westminster be 
reduced as a result of the powers passed to the Irish, and 
that the remaining Irish representatives be unable to vote on 
matters that did not affect Ireland. This became known as 
Gladstone’s ‘in and out’ solution, and it was abandoned by him 
as unworkable after considerable soul-searching. According 
to Vernon Bogdanor (2001), this was for two reasons: first, 
because of the difficulty of separating Irish and UK matters, 
particularly around legislation that affected funding; and 
second, because of its potential to undermine parliamentary 
government through the creation of alternative majorities in 
the Commons. Both of these criticisms have re-emerged in 
relation to EVEL, and are discussed in chapter 3. When home 
rule was finally implemented for Northern Ireland in the 1920s, 
1. The return of the English Question
On the morning after the Scottish independence referendum, David Cameron stood on the steps 
of Downing Street and signalled a shift in the UK government’s approach to territorial management. 
‘We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the millions of voices of England must also be 
heard’, he said. ‘The question of English votes for English laws – the so-called West Lothian question 
– requires a decisive answer’.3  This important statement – widely criticised by Cameron’s political 
opponents – paved the way for the reform that provides the focus of this report.
3   ‘Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister’, 19 September 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/scottish-independence-
referendum-statement-by-the-prime-minister [accessed on 29 September 2016].
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For how long will English constituencies and English 
hon. Members tolerate not just 71 Scots, 36 Welsh and 
a number of Ulstermen but at least 119 hon. Members 
from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an 
important, and probably often decisive, effect on English 
politics while they themselves have no say in the same 
matters in Scotland, Wales and Ireland?4
In essence, his complaint was that devolution elsewhere would 
accentuate an anomaly in legislative voting arrangements. 
MPs representing Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
would continue to be able to vote on legislation that affected 
only England, but it would no longer be possible for English 
representatives to reciprocate by voting on matters that had 
been devolved to those territories. Behind this seemingly 
arcane conundrum lay the deeper question of whether 
devolution resulted in too much power being amassed – both 
at the peripheries and at the centre – by the smaller nations, 
at England’s expense. It has since been largely forgotten that 
during consideration of Labour’s devolution legislation, its 
parliamentary opponents succeeded in incorporating a new 
provision (which Dalyell himself supported) that would have 
made it possible for certain votes on bills that did not relate to 
Scotland, but were passed with the support of Scottish MPs, 
to be confirmed two weeks later through a second vote.5 This 
innovation, though never put into effect, may well represent the 
first occasion when a form of EVEL achieved support from a 
majority of members in the House.
This brief review of previous moments when concerns about 
national representation at Westminster has become salient in 
British politics yields two key insights. First, it suggests that 
it has been the acquisition by some territories of enhanced 
powers of self-government that has historically been the 
catalyst for the counter-claims of others. This has given 
today’s English Question a defensive and reactive quality. 
And, second, the question of how to handle legislation 
at Westminster that only affects certain parts of the UK, 
has always been a matter of both considerable technical 
complexity and great symbolic significance. Most recently, 
this dilemma has been the site of an angst-ridden debate 
about where the England sits within parliament’s structures 
and processes, and whether England’s needs and interests 
are rendered secondary by the state’s need to strike bargains 
with its more distant territorial members.
Post-devolution proposals for reform
Dalyell’s concerns were averted in the short run, but the 
same issues surfaced again, this time more resonantly in the 
context of the devolution settlements introduced by Tony Blair’s 
Labour government. In 1999 the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales were established, alongside their 
respective executive bodies. Likewise, while the earlier Northern 
Ireland devolution settlement had collapsed in the early 1970s, 
the Belfast Agreement in 1998 paved the way for its return, 
and led to the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and Executive. But while devolution was intended to offset 
concerns about England’s dominance within the union, it also 
gave rise to renewed unease about England’s constitutional 
the territory retained a reduced number of Westminster MPs but 
with full voting rights – a slightly different solution known as the 
‘devolution discount’.
Similar issues were raised in the 1919-20 Conference on 
Devolution, a notable gathering of MPs and peers that 
considered proposals to implement devolution to England, 
Scotland and Wales (Conference on Devolution 1920; Evans 
2015a, 2015b). The conference reached agreement on several 
significant matters, including those policy areas that might be 
passed to territorial governments, and the merits of devolution 
to England as a whole rather than its constituent English 
regions. But its participants were divided over the form 
such an arrangement should take, and their disagreement 
foreshadowed later differences on this score. Some favoured 
devolution to subordinate legislatures with separate elections, 
similar to today’s devolved legislatures. Others advocated 
the devolution of powers to ‘grand councils’ of existing 
parliamentarians within the Westminster parliament, an idea 
closer in some respects to today’s EVEL arrangements. 
Failure to reach agreement on this crucial matter undermined 
the prospects of the ideas produced by this historic gathering.
Issues of territorial representation at Westminster then 
disappeared from view for the bulk of the last century, with a 
couple of notable exceptions. Following the implementation 
of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, Northern Ireland was 
the only territory within the UK to enjoy devolution. Yet, despite 
the number of its MPs being reduced after devolution’s 
introduction, their ability to vote on matters that did not affect 
Northern Ireland became a thorny issue in the mid-1960s 
when Harold Wilson’s Labour government held a small 
majority in the Commons. Wilson’s initiative to nationalise 
the steel industry looked set to be defeated due to the votes 
of Northern Ireland’s MPs, even though the policy would not 
have affected that part of the UK. Wilson briefly considered 
reforms to prevent them from voting, but relented once he was 
appraised of the constitutional complexities this would involve 
(Walker and Mulvenna 2015). Even for a territory as small as 
Northern Ireland, the ‘devolution discount’ could not entirely 
eliminate the possibility of its MPs decisively affecting votes 
on matters applying elsewhere.
In the 1970s, the focus of these debates shifted decisively 
to the potential effect of devolution on England, in the 
context of proposals from the Labour government to devolve 
power to Scotland and Wales. The pressure to introduce 
devolution built up from the 1960s onwards and enjoyed the 
broad support of the Labour and Liberal parties. Attempts 
by the Callaghan government to establish Scottish and 
Welsh devolved institutions in the late 1970s failed when the 
people of Wales rejected such a move in a referendum, and 
a Scottish vote on the establishment of an assembly with 
legislative powers failed – notwithstanding a majority vote 
in favour – due to a statutory requirement that 40% of the 
Scottish electorate support the initiative.
In the course of parliamentary debates on this issue, the 
question of what devolution would mean for England became 
an important point of contention. One staunch opponent of 
the Scotland Bill of 1977-78, the Labour MP for West Lothian, 
Tam Dalyell, posed what later became known as the ‘West 
Lothian Question’:
4   HC Deb 14 November 1977, column 123.
5   Scotland Act 1978, section 66.
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position. During the parliamentary debates on the Scotland Bill, 
the anomaly identified by Dalyell cropped up once more, and 
was connected by some Conservatives to the question of a 
constitutional imbalance and its possible effects upon England. 
Former prime minister John Major asked the following question 
in the Commons:
Can he tell us why Scottish Members should be able to 
vote on such matters as health and education in England 
and Wales, whereas English, Welsh and Northern Irish 
Members will not be able to vote on those matters as 
they affect Scotland? It is not just the West Lothian 
question; it is the west Dorset, west Hampshire and west 
Lancashire question, and we still await an answer. 6
In anticipation of the introduction of devolution, various 
suggestions for reform at Westminster were mooted. In 
particular, the Commons Procedure Committee (1999) 
proposed the fairly modest step (which was never 
implemented) of using territorially-constituted second reading 
committees on bills that applied to only one part of the 
UK. The legislation that established devolution to Scotland 
also removed the overrepresentation of Scottish MPs at 
Westminster, a provision that was put into effect in time for the 
2005 general election.7
But following the formal implementation and subsequent 
expansion of devolution, awareness of the West Lothian 
anomaly has grown, and it became a repeated complaint 
among those disenchanted with the Labour government. The 
Conservative party began to call for reform of Westminster’s 
voting arrangements, and it included commitments to 
introduce a version of EVEL in all of its general election 
manifestos from 2001 onwards (Conservative Party 2001, 
2005, 2010, 2015a). During the 2000s, various ideas for 
resolving the West Lothian Question were aired within the 
Conservative party, and the issues associated with EVEL 
became much more widely familiar. Each of these proposals 
contributed to a developing body of specialist knowledge 
within the party about this question.
In 2000, the Commission to Strengthen Parliament, 
established by party leader William Hague and chaired by 
Conservative peer Lord (Philip) Norton of Louth, examined 
how England-only legislation should be dealt with post-
devolution (Commission to Strengthen Parliament 2000). 
The commission explicitly rejected the notion of an English 
parliament, in part because such an arrangement might 
risk destabilising the UK given the relative size of England 
within it. Instead, it offered arguments for England-only 
legislation to be voted on effectively by English MPs alone. 
Under its proposals, the Commons Speaker would be 
required to certify the territorial application of legislation, and 
any provisions applying exclusively to England (or England 
and Wales) would then pass through a revised Commons 
legislative process, with second reading, committee and 
report stages all voted on by English (or English and Welsh) 
MPs only, and reflecting the party balance in that part of the 
UK. For third reading (the bill’s final stage during its initial 
Commons passage), all MPs would formally be entitled to 
vote, but the commission anticipated the development of 
a ‘convention’ that those representing parts of the UK not 
affected by the legislation would not do so. 
A different model was proposed some years later by 
senior Conservative Sir Malcolm Rifkind, formerly Scotland 
Secretary in Margaret Thatcher’s government. He proposed 
that England-only legislation should be considered and 
voted on by an English grand committee, which he argued 
would not circumvent the constitutional position of MPs from 
across the UK. This he modelled on the existing Scottish 
grand committee arrangements. Rifkind allowed for the 
possibility of the UK-wide House overturning the decision 
of English MPs, but he also supported the adoption of a 
convention whereby they would not seek to do so (see 
Rifkind 2010).
A similar idea was elaborated in a report by the Conservative 
Democracy Task Force, set up by party leader David 
Cameron and chaired by Kenneth Clarke. This recommended 
that legislation certified as English should pass through a 
Commons legislative process that provided both English and 
UK-wide MPs veto rights at different stages (Conservative 
Democracy Task Force 2008). The second and third reading 
stages would be voted on by the whole House, allowing UK-
wide MPs to veto the entire bill at either end of its Commons 
passage. But English MPs would have control at committee 
and report stages – the two Commons stages at which a bill 
is amendable – enabling them to delete any provisions that 
they disagreed with (and/or to add new ones). Consequently, 
the passage of England-only legislation would require the 
assent of both English and UK-wide MPs, but neither would 
have the power to force through legislation against the 
wishes of the other. A design similar to this was subsequently 
proposed by former civil servant Jim Gallagher (2012) in a 
report published by the centre-left think tank, the Institute for 
Public Policy Research.
Perhaps the most influential and important document setting 
out the arguments for reform, and considering different 
institutional options, was produced by the independent 
McKay Commission (2013). Appointed by the coalition 
government, the commission was tasked with reflecting 
on the territorial implications of devolution for the House 
of Commons. In its final report it offered some important 
arguments for the creation of a clearer English dimension 
at Westminster, and for the development of some form of 
‘voice’ for the English in particular. It set out different ways in 
which this might be achieved within the House of Commons, 
arguing that voice was a more important and feasible goal 
than moving to establish a watertight veto on the part of 
English MPs.
A key assumption of the McKay Commission’s conclusions 
was that, once England’s collective voice on England-only 
matters was more clearly articulated at Westminster, it 
would be much harder politically for the House to override 
the will of England’s representatives. Instead of the formal 
veto that others had proposed, the McKay Commission 
therefore provided a model for a more informal arrangement 
built upon the establishment of a greater sense of English 
recognition within parliament. Its argument rested in part 
upon the assumption that electoral incentives would serve to 
compel the political parties to listen to English preferences: 
6   HC Deb 14 May 1997, column 58.
7   Scotland Act 1998, section 86.
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a party wishing to appeal to voters in England would be 
reluctant to impose policy on them against the wishes of their 
democratic representatives. The commission floated a menu 
of procedural changes that might reinforce these incentives, 
including: territorially-constituted pre-legislative scrutiny 
committees; new English (and English and Welsh) ‘grand 
committees’ to debate whether to give ‘consent’ to affected 
legislation; specially-constituted public bill committees 
reflecting the party balance in England (or England and 
Wales); and reporting the result of divisions among only 
English (or English and Welsh) MPs separately from the UK-
wide result.
None of these mechanisms were intended to be formally 
binding, but rather to make it politically harder to override 
England’s expressed interests. As such, the McKay 
Commission’s suggestions were designed to enhance 
the role of English MPs without eroding the sovereignty of 
the House as a whole. Its principal arguments might have 
supplied the basis for a wider agreement among the political 
parties. But any such prospect was undermined by the 
Labour party’s refusal to engage with these, suspicious that 
this kind of reform was little more than a politically inspired 
ruse by the Conservative party given the latter’s traditionally 
stronger electoral performance in England. The McKay 
Commission’s report was welcomed in many other quarters, 
however (and subsequently to some extent by Labour),8 and 
supplied the most important extended engagement with the 
case for, and implementation of, EVEL in official circles. Its 
thinking and ideas still merit consideration by those tasked 
with developing this system. But a key question about 
its arguments is whether their guiding assumption – that 
politicians could be trusted to show self-restraint on bills that 
only affect England – still holds. The idea that the Commons 
can continue without a binding procedure in such instances is 
now more questionable in the wake of the politicisation of the 
English Question since 2014.
These various attempts to answer the West Lothian Question 
reflected the growing conviction in parts of the political world 
that some kind of balancing reform was required to alleviate 
the asymmetries bequeathed by devolution. This change was 
sometimes depicted in reactive and precautionary terms, 
designed to obviate the potential growth of English grievance, 
and, as such, was envisaged by some Conservatives as 
a measure to prolong the political structures of the union. 
But there also emerged in some quarters a slightly different 
view – both in parts of the Conservative party and beyond 
it – that the English were entitled to expect a more substantive 
degree of recognition and protection, and that the hitherto 
overlooked principle of national sovereignty now needed to 
be given its due in relation to them too (Kenny 2015). Such a 
justification underpinned the arguments of some politicians 
in the Conservative party for the creation of a much clearer 
and more transparent English process within Westminster. As 
we will demonstrate below, these subtly differing rationales 
for introducing EVEL are connected to slightly different 
conceptions of how it should operate.
Commons votes post-devolution
When David Cameron insisted in September 2014 that the 
English Question now deserved political attention, he chose 
to focus upon the resolution of the West Lothian conundrum 
as the primary site for dealing with the vexed questions of how 
England should be governed and politically represented. In 
so doing, he generated the expectation that the procedural 
changes this involved would do much to reconcile the English 
to the parliamentary system from which they had become 
estranged. In political terms, he tapped into the collective 
memory of earlier episodes, under Blair’s government, when 
the majority preference of English MPs was overruled. These 
have played an iconic role in Conservative thinking about 
devolution and its implications.
The prelude to them arose over the controversial question of 
the banning of hunting with dogs. Following devolution, this 
was no longer an issue applicable to Scotland. Conservative 
MP David Lidington – currently Leader of the House and 
responsible for the new EVEL procedures – emphasised 
this territorial anomaly when he called upon Scottish MPs to 
desist from voting in 2000.9 Ultimately, as Russell and Lodge 
(2006) explain, the vote at second reading was passed by a 
sufficiently large margin that Scottish representatives made 
no difference to the outcome.
But the question moved to the fore in the 2001-05 parliament. 
On two notable occasions the Commons backed contentious 
legislation that applied primarily to England (or England and 
Wales) due to the votes of non-English (or English and Welsh) 
MPs. The first was the Health and Social Care (Community 
Health and Standards) Bill (2002-03), which provided for 
the establishment of foundation hospitals in England. At its 
Commons report stage, in July 2003, MPs voted effectively 
to delete the foundation hospital provisions from the bill. 
Although the government won by 35 votes, among English 
MPs it would have been defeated by a single vote (Lodge 
2003b). Four months later, in November 2003, MPs voted on 
an amendment with the same effect that had been passed 
in the Lords. As shown in Table 1, this time MPs voted with 
the government to reject the amendment by 17 votes, but 
among only those representing English constituencies the 
government would instead have been defeated by 17 votes.
Table 1: Territorial breakdown of Commons division on 
motion disagreeing to Lords amendment 1 (on foundation 
hospitals) on Health and Social Care (Community Health 
and Standards) Bill 2002-03, 19 November 2003
For Govt Against 
Govt
Govt win?
England 234 251 No (-17)
Scotland 44 17 Yes (+27)
Wales 24 11 Yes (+13)
Northern Ireland 0 6 No (-6)
Total 302 285 Yes (+17)
Source: Adapted from Lodge (2003a).
8   Labour’s 2015 general election manifesto stated that the McKay Commission’s recommendation of an England-only committee stage ‘must now be considered 
as part of the Constitutional Convention process’ (Labour Party 2015:64).
9   HC Deb 12 June 2000, column 642.
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Figure 1: Newspaper mentions of West Lothian Question 
per year, 1996-2015
Source: LexisNexis search of UK national newspapers conducted 
by the authors, 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2015.
Public attitudes
One of the most important, and contentious, aspects of 
the debate about EVEL concerns public perceptions and 
expectations, and specifically whether this new process is 
favoured by a majority of people in England and across the 
UK. There has been much rhetoric and numerous, often 
unsubstantiated, claims about what the English now want in 
constitutional terms. In this section we consider the available 
polling evidence, as well as research and evidence gathered 
by Kenny in his study of the transformation of English 
national consciousness since the 1990s. We seek to shed 
light on two questions in particular: (a) have the English 
become more disgruntled with the union settlement in recent 
years, as many advocates of this reform claim?; and (b) 
does EVEL appear congruent with the shifting constitutional 
preferences of the English?
Before attempting to answer these questions, it is useful to 
trace some wider trends in English identity. In very broad 
terms, there is a quite considerable body of evidence to 
suggest that there has been a notable rise in national self-
consciousness among the English over the past 20 years. 
Questions about who the English are and what defines 
Englishness have become far more culturally salient; and 
there is some evidence that the national sentiments of 
a growing number of the English have come to acquire 
a political resonance (Kenny 2014; Wellings 2012). But, 
importantly, this has not in any straightforward way resulted 
in the abandonment of existing kinds of identification for 
most people. An affinity with locality, regional identity and 
affiliation to the UK remain important for the majority of the 
English. Nevertheless, as the British Social Attitudes survey 
shows, when people are forced to choose which identity they 
are more attached to, Englishness has grown in popularity 
in relation to Britishness. It grew, first, in the years between 
1992 and 1999, and then again after 1999, in the wake of 
devolution.12 Thereafter, pollsters disagree about whether 
there has been a further growth and deepening of English 
national sentiment (Ormston and Curtice 2010; Wyn Jones et 
al. 2012).
A similar situation occurred in January 2004, on the second 
reading of the Higher Education Bill (2003-04). Unlike on 
foundation hospitals, this vote did not strictly apply to only one 
part of the UK: second reading is taken on the bill as a whole, 
and this legislation included other provisions that applied 
across the UK. Nevertheless, its most contentious provisions 
allowed universities to increase student tuition fees, a policy 
that was to apply only in England and Wales (and in the latter 
case, the National Assembly for Wales would decide whether 
to use the powers) (Lodge 2004). As shown in Table 2, 
although the House voted with the government in support of 
the bill, among MPs representing only England (and England 
and Wales) the government would have been defeated (by 15 
and 6 votes respectively).
Table 2: Territorial breakdown of Commons division on 
second reading of Higher Education Bill 2003-04, 27 
January 2004
For Govt Against 
Govt
Govt win?
England 246 261 No (-15)
Scotland 46 21 Yes (+25)
Wales 24 15 Yes (+9)
Northern Ireland 0 14 No (-14)
Total 316 311 Yes (+5)
Source: Adapted from Lodge (2004).
These outcomes attracted extensive commentary and some 
criticism about the injustice being done to England from press 
and politicians alike. In anticipation of the vote on tuition fees 
columnist Simon Heffer criticised ‘the morally indefensible 
action of Scots MPs’, arguing that ‘the reputation of Parliament 
itself is at stake’.10 After that vote, Conservative frontbencher 
Tim Yeo argued in the Commons that it was ‘completely 
wrong that a Bill that imposes higher charges on students 
attending English universities should be carried by this House 
only by using the votes of Scottish Members of Parliament’.11 
While Commons divisions such as these have occurred very 
rarely, there is some evidence that they may have provoked 
a wider-reaching debate about this constitutional anomaly. 
It is indeed noteworthy that mentions of the West Lothian 
Question in the UK press spiked significantly in the few years 
subsequently, as shown in Figure 1.
10   Simon Heffer, ‘The deadly dangers of this abuse, Daily Mail, 19 January 2004.
11   HC Deb 27 January 2004, column 275.
12   David Goodhart and Eric Kaufman, ‘A respectable Englishness’, Fabian Review, 16 August 2016, http://www.fabians.org.uk/a-respectable-englishness/ 
[accessed on 29 September 2016].
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There is an important qualitative dimension to this change 
– which polling does not always capture – whereby a sense 
of English national identity appears to have become a 
more important and meaningful attachment in this period, 
according to various studies (Kenny 2014; Skey 2011). But 
as the desire to express or celebrate a pride in Englishness 
has grown, the paucity of opportunities to do so – in 
institutional and political terms – has become an issue of 
growing frustration for some. During the Blair and Brown 
years, Englishness was rarely depicted by public authorities 
and politicians in positive terms, while ‘Britishness’ was 
presented as a preferred civic and multi-cultural form of 
patriotism. From the mid-2000s, there is some evidence 
to suggest that a growing number of the English (with the 
notable exception of those living in London) were inclined to 
prioritise English identity as their preferred form of national 
identification. Several surveys have reported that a majority 
of those who felt this way were most likely to be Eurosceptic, 
and to be more disgruntled at England’s position within the 
domestic union (Wyn Jones et al. 2012). During the course 
of the EU referendum campaign, this striking correlation 
between English identity and a vote to leave was reflected in 
various surveys.13
In comparison, how the English feel about the UK’s 
constitutional structure remains harder to divine. The 
indifference towards constitutional issues, and low levels of 
awareness about devolution, which have typified English 
attitudes, do appear to have changed in the last few years. 
Various surveys reported quite considerable irritation at 
particular features of the post-devolution settlement, and 
in some polling this disenchantment rose during the 2000s 
(while in others, such as the BSA survey, it remained 
constant). But disgruntlement on two specific issues is 
apparent across all available survey data. As former senior 
civil servant Jim Gallagher put it in 2012:
So far, the English have been pretty tolerant about the 
Scottish variation, but increasingly two issues concern 
them: money and representation. Does Scotland do 
unfairly well in the distribution of common resources, and 
do Scottish Westminster representatives have too much 
say on English questions?14 
We focus here on the second of these: the potential influence 
of Scottish MPs on English legislative matters, which the 
government’s EVEL reform is designed to address. On this 
issue public attitudes have been measured regularly in 
surveys since the implementation of devolution. Below we 
present key results of the British Social Attitudes and the 
Future of England surveys. There has been consistent and 
growing agreement from English respondents over this period 
that Scottish MPs should no longer vote on England-only 
laws in the House of Commons, as Table 3 shows. What is 
especially striking here is the proportion of respondents who 
‘strongly’ agreed with this proposition, which has risen from 
18% in 2000 to 55% in 2012. According to psephologists 
Rachel Ormston and John Curtice (2010:156), public opinion 
in England ‘consistently expresses some disquiet at the 
apparent inequity of the WLQ [West Lothian Question]’.
13   E.g. James Kanagasooriam, ‘The English question’, Populus, June 2016, http://www.populus.co.uk/2016/06/the-english-question/  
[accessed on 5 October 2016].
14   Jim Gallagher, ‘So, what about England?’, The Scotsman, 21 November 2012, http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/ 
jim-gallagher-so-what-about-england-1-2647129 [accessed on 29 September 2016].
Table 3: English opinion on Scottish MPs voting on England-only legislation, 2000-2012
2000 2001 2003 2007 2009 2011 2012
Strongly agree 18 19 22 25 31 53 55
Agree 45 38 38 36 35 26 26
Total agree 63 57 60 61 66 79 81
Neither agree nor disagree 19 18 18 17 17 * 8
Disagree 8 12 10 9 6 8 4
Strongly disagree 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
Total disagree 9 14 11 10 7 10 6
Source: Wyn Jones et. al. (2013), based on British Social Attitudes survey (2000–09) & Future of England survey (2011–12). 
Question: ‘Now that Scotland has its own parliament, Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on 
laws that only affect England’. 
Note: Figures given as percentages.
12 Finding the Good in EVEL: An evaluation of ‘English Votes for English Laws’ in the House of Commons
Importantly, evidence supplied by the Scottish Social Attitudes 
survey suggests that the principle that only English MPs should 
vote on England-only legislation has been supported by many 
Scots too, with around half of respondents generally in support 
and up to a quarter opposed. In January 2013, 53% agreed 
with the proposition, compared to 18% who disagreed.15
Table 4 approaches this issue from a different angle, reporting 
data only from the Future of England survey. It shows that 
in recent years only a minority of the English favoured the 
then status quo and, when presented with various possible 
options for change, some form of EVEL was the most popular 
preference. Support for radical solutions to the English 
Question, like an English parliament, lags significantly behind 
more incremental reform to Westminster voting arrangements. 
Quite how these ideas are understood by respondents 
remains an open question, but there does appear to be a 
majority among the English to give English MPs greater say 
on English legislative matters.
Table 4: Constitutional preferences for the governance of 
England, 2011-2014
2011 2012 2014
For England to be governed as it is 
now with laws made by all MPs in 
the UK parliament
24 21 18
For England to be governed with 
laws made by English MPs in the 
UK parliament
34 36 40
For England as a whole to have its 
own new English parliament with 
law-making powers
20 20 16
For each region of England to have 
its own assembly
9 8 9
Don’t know 14 16 17
Sources: Wyn Jones et al. (2012, 2013); Jeffery et al. (2014). 
Question: ‘With all the changes going on in the way different parts 
of the United Kingdom are run, which of the following do you think 
would be best for England?’. 
Note: Figures given as percentages.
These findings have become an important point of reference 
in debates about the English Question, amidst growing 
interest from 2010 onwards in the political dimensions 
of a perceived rise in English nationalism. Since the EU 
referendum, there has been a notable growth of interest in the 
implications of English nationalism and the role it may have 
played in shaping the preferences of English voters towards 
Brexit. A key question now is whether the disenchantment 
reflected in that vote extends as well to the political system 
and domestic union. This forms a key backdrop to the 
government’s efforts to answer the West Lothian Question.
Development of EVEL under the coalition 
and Conservative governments
David Cameron’s decision to inject political energy into the 
English Question in 2014 therefore reflected a number of 
developments in popular attitudes and constitutional thinking. 
The desire he expressed to respond to a perceived imbalance 
in the UK’s territorial constitution was widely shared. But it 
was also, in part, a partisan calculation by the leader of the 
Conservative party determined to outflank his political rivals 
on either side.
The Conservatives’ position was, to some extent, motivated 
by the growing willingness of senior figures in UKIP to 
speak to English grievances during the Scottish referendum 
campaign. In the run-up to the referendum vote, UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage argued that ‘the English are feeling rather 
ignored in all of this’, adding: ‘We have been talking about 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland a lot over the last 16, 
17 years and a new constitutional settlement for a federal UK 
will suit everybody’.16  But EVEL also helped the Conservatives 
to outmanoeuvre their more traditional rivals. Both the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties had generally favoured 
schemes for greater regional self-government in England as 
their preferred response to the English Question. This position 
had become particularly vulnerable in political terms once the 
only referendum on regional assemblies, held in north east 
England in 2004, resulted in an overwhelming rejection. Both 
of these parties responded to the Conservatives’ interest in 
the West Lothian anomaly by challenging the latter’s unionist 
credentials, and instead promoted the decentralisation of 
powers to local and/or regional government. But, in a context 
where a rising sense of English national sentiment has 
been an especially powerful trend, this position lacked the 
resonance and popular connection that the Conservatives’ 
focus upon English interests and sensibilities came to acquire.
In addition to this electoral interest, perceptions of EVEL 
were coloured by the suspicion that it was a device designed 
to ensnare a prospective Labour-led government at some 
point in the future. This is because, in recent years, the 
Conservatives have tended to be better represented among 
constituencies in England, while Labour has performed better 
in Wales and, until very recently, Scotland.
Having delivered his rhetoric about the need for English 
voices to be more clearly heard within the political system, 
Cameron established a cabinet committee chaired by 
William Hague to consider possible solutions to the West 
Lothian Question, and its focus quickly moved on to some 
of the technical and procedural complications associated 
with EVEL. Reflecting internal disagreements within the 
government – not only between the coalition parties but also 
on the Conservative backbenches – the government took the 
15   ‘Do you agree or disagree that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on England only laws?’, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/ 
do-you-agree-or-disagree-that-scottish-mps-should-not-be-allowed-to-vote-on-en-6#table [accessed on 5 October 2016].
16  ‘Nick Clegg backs ‘radical’ English devolution plan’, BBC News, 12 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29155854 [accessed on 5 October 
2016].
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17   The Liberal Democrat submission argued that any new England-only stage should represent parties in proportion to their vote share in England, rather than in 
proportion to their number of MPs. 
unusual step of publishing a command paper that set out 
four different options for reform: three Conservative and one 
Liberal Democrat (Leader of the House of Commons 2014). 
The Labour party was also invited to participate, but declined.
The three Conservative options were based on the various 
proposals discussed above: one on Norton’s Commission to 
Strengthen Parliament; the second on Clarke’s Conservative 
Democracy Task Force; and the third a strengthened version 
of some of the McKay Commission’s proposals.17 The party 
plumped for the third of these, but was unable to secure 
support from the Liberal Democrats to put the matter to a 
vote in the Commons. In the 2015 general election campaign 
the Conservatives included the proposals in their UK and 
English manifestos (Conservative Party 2015a, 2015b). 
Following the party’s election victory, the new government 
moved swiftly to implement its proposals, publishing draft 
standing orders in July.
Yet the suspicion that EVEL was being pursued for partisan 
reasons has hung over its implementation and legitimacy. 
While the dissolution of the coalition might have resolved 
the impasse on the government benches themselves, it 
did nothing to generate wider support for this reform. This 
is shown by the highly partisan breakdown of the final 
Commons vote to approve the changes, presented in Table 
5. The very apparent lack of support outside the Conservative 
party for these rules has merely reinforced suspicions of 
their partisan character. As a consequence, the new EVEL 
standing orders lack the sense of legitimacy required of 
constitutional innovations if they are to become embedded 
features of the parliamentary system.
Supported only by one party in the Commons, the longer-
term viability of this system depends upon persuading a 
wider range of political actors that some form of EVEL is 
now needed to renew the confidence of the English in the 
parliamentary process. While accusations of political self-
interest have long accompanied moments of constitutional 
change in Britain, in previous cases – for instance Labour’s 
devolution programme – momentous reforms have been 
quickly accepted by their one-time foes. But because EVEL 
was introduced by a single vote of the House – rather than 
through legislation – it could well be suspended in the 
same fashion. This prospect alone gives the reform a less 
durable appearance and raises the concerning prospect of 
governments of different political stripes introducing ‘rules 
of the game’ which they perceive to be most advantageous 
to their political interests. This is exactly the kind of situation 
which the British political system has, for the most part, 
previously managed to avoid. The legitimacy this reform is 
able to command is therefore of central importance to its 
long-term survival.
Reflecting this lack of consensus, a series of objections have 
been made against EVEL, including the contentions that it 
will: politicise the office of the Speaker; create two classes of 
MP; undermine UK-level government; and is unacceptably 
complex and opaque. These criticisms deserve careful 
analysis, and we will return to them in chapter 3. But before 
we consider arguments for and against these procedures, it is 
necessary first to set out how the new processes are actually 
intended to work.
Table 5: Party breakdown of Commons division to approve the 
EVEL standing orders, 22 October 2015
For EVEL Against EVEL
Conservative 312 0
Labour 0 200
Scottish National 0 54
Democratic Unionist 0 6
Liberal Democrat 0 3
Plaid Cymru 0 3
Social Democratic & Labour 0 3
Ulster Unionist 0 0
Green 0 0
UK Independence 0 0
Independent* 0 1
Total 312 270
* Lady Sylvia Hermon.
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Certification process
The EVEL procedures implement a series of changes to 
the House of Commons’ scrutiny of legislation that applies 
exclusively to a particular geographical area within the 
UK.18 For these new stages and processes to occur, it is 
first necessary for somebody to determine whether or not a 
particular piece of legislation relates to a relevant part of the 
UK. Under the EVEL procedures, this process is conducted 
by the Commons Speaker, and is known as ‘certification’.  
It is reminiscent of – although not identical to – the Speaker’s 
existing certification responsibilities on bills that relate 
exclusively to Scotland, and also on money bills.19
The EVEL procedures apply to legislation that relates 
exclusively to one of three geographical areas: England; 
England and Wales; and England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The third of these is relevant only to Finance Bills (and related 
business), so we do not routinely refer to it in this report. The 
most high-profile type of legislation to which EVEL applies is 
government-sponsored primary legislation (i.e. bills, which if 
passed become Acts of Parliament).20 On primary legislation, 
the Speaker must effectively break down the bill into ‘units’ 
and consider each for certification separately. These units are 
principally the clauses and schedules that make up the bill 
(and by extension whole bills) – plus, less frequently, agreed 
amendments that change or eliminate an earlier certification 
decision and motions relating to Lords amendments and 
messages. Aside from primary legislation, the most important 
other type of business on which EVEL applies is secondary 
legislation (i.e. statutory instruments, which generally take the 
form of ‘regulations’ and ‘orders’). On secondary legislation, the 
unit considered by the Speaker is the instrument as a whole.
To issue a ‘certificate’, the Speaker must be satisfied that the 
entire unit in question (i.e. usually the clause, schedule, or 
statutory instrument) meets both elements of a two-part test: 
first, it applies exclusively to that part of the UK (excluding 
‘minor or consequential’ effects); and second, that it would 
be within the power of at least one devolved assembly in a 
different part of the UK to make comparable provision. So, 
for example, for a clause to be certified as relating exclusively 
to England and Wales, the Speaker must be satisfied that 
it applies only in England and Wales, and that the Scottish 
Parliament and/or the Northern Ireland Assembly would have 
the power to make equivalent legislation.
Several aspects of this process deserve emphasis. One is 
that the unit of legislation under consideration must meet both 
parts of the test – for example, a clause that applies only in 
England cannot be certified if the policy area is not devolved 
elsewhere. Another is that the entire unit in question must 
meet the test – so a clause or statutory instrument cannot be 
certified if even one element within it fails to meet both parts 
of the test. In addition, the Speaker cannot certify legislation 
as relating to any area other than the three listed above. 
When making his decisions, the Speaker relies on advice 
from a senior Commons clerk and legal experts in the Office 
of Speaker’s Counsel. In addition, the government publishes 
its own advice, which necessarily informs these decisions, 
and the Speaker has indicated his willingness to receive 
representations from other interested parties.21
The double veto
Once legislation has been certified, the most important 
change to the process is that MPs from England (or England 
and Wales) have the opportunity to veto it. This right is in 
addition to the whole House’s existing veto rights, and for this 
reason we refer to EVEL as a ‘double veto’ system. As such, 
both English (or English and Welsh) and UK-wide MPs have 
the opportunity to veto certified legislation.
On primary legislation, the double veto is implemented 
through a fairly elaborate system of new legislative stages. 
Figure 2 gives a diagrammatic representation of the pre-
existing process on primary legislation (in grey) and the new, 
additional EVEL stages (in red).22 As shown, once a bill has 
been introduced, the Speaker conducts his initial certification. 
The bill then passes through most of its stages as usual 
(with the potential exception of committee stage, described 
below), with MPs from across the UK entitled to speak and 
to vote. Consequently, even on a bill certified as England-
only, MPs from across the whole UK have the opportunity to 
amend the bill as they wish, including the chance to delete 
individual provisions or even to reject the entire bill outright. 
2. The new EVEL procedures explained
The EVEL reform introduced by the government in October 2015 has been much caricatured and 
misunderstood, in part as a consequence of its complex character. In this chapter we present a 
brief explanation of how the EVEL procedures work. In doing so, we give particular emphasis to 
one of EVEL’s key features: the ‘double veto’. Put simply, this means that both English (or English 
and Welsh) MPs, on the one hand, and the whole House, on the other, have the power to veto 
legislation that applies exclusively to England (or England and Wales). As such, both groups 
of MPs must support such a provision for it to be passed by the Commons. This important 
characteristic of the EVEL system has not been sufficiently appreciated by most commentary on it. 
18   EVEL also applies to a small number of non-legislative items, notably certain reports that require parliamentary approval (which are automatically subject to 
EVEL without the need for certification: see Standing Order No. 83R).
19   For Scottish bills, see Standing Order No. 97. For money bills, see the Parliament Act 1911, section 1.
20   EVEL does not apply to private members’ bills.
21   The government’s advice is usually published on the relevant bill’s page on the parliament website and/or deposited in the House of  
Commons Library.
22  Strictly speaking Figure 2 shows a Commons-starting bill; the process for Lords-starters is almost, although not exactly, identical.
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23   Substantive debate is only possible in the first of the committees, which is always the committee relating to the largest territorial area of certification, but this 
debate may relate to any of the consent motions to be moved.
24 The removal of these provisions may result in inconsistencies within the legislation; a new ‘consequential consideration’ stage allows these to be corrected.
25  Such motions may also be certified as relating to both England and England and Wales, thus requiring a ‘triple majority’.
At the conclusion of report stage (the final stage during a 
bill’s initial Commons passage at which it may be amended), 
the Speaker is required to re-examine the bill and certify any 
clause or schedule that meets the two-part test, plus any 
amendments passed by MPs that resulted in a change to his 
initial certification decisions. If at this point the bill includes 
any provision certified by the Speaker, this triggers the need 
for new ‘legislative grand committee’ stages, which are the 
mechanism through which the English (and/or English and 
Welsh) veto may be exercised.
A legislative grand committee stage is held for each 
territorial area identified in the certification, and comprises 
all MPs representing constituencies in the area in question 
(others may attend and speak, but not vote). So, for example, 
a bill with certain clauses certified as relating to England 
and Wales, and others to England, will hold legislative 
grand committees for each of these areas in succession. 
In principle, these stages enable MPs from the areas 
concerned to debate the relevant provisions.23 However, the 
primary purpose is to give them the opportunity to ‘consent’ 
to the certified provisions, including, if necessary, through 
formal votes. If the consent motion is passed, the bill moves 
to third reading as usual. But if consent is withheld, this 
triggers a series of new stages to resolve any conflict, most 
importantly a new ‘reconsideration’ stage to allow UK MPs 
to propose a compromise. If consent is withheld a second 
time, the English (or English and Welsh) veto is automatically 
applied, and the certified provisions are deleted from the 
bill.24 Any non-certified provisions, along with others on 
which consent was given, then pass to third reading stage, 
at which MPs from the whole UK may vote on whether or 
not to approve the bill in its final form. This series of stages 
means that a certified provision cannot be passed by the 
Commons unless approved both by the whole House and by 
the relevant subset of MPs.
In other cases, a simpler way of implementing the double 
veto applies, whereby divisions require a ‘double majority’ to 
pass. Under this procedure, in any division a majority of both 
UK MPs and those representing constituencies in England 
(or England and Wales) must vote in support of a proposal 
for it to be approved. This applies on primary legislation 
at the ‘Commons consideration of Lords amendments’ 
(CCLA) stages, which occur if the Lords makes amendments 
following a bill’s initial passage through the Commons. The 
Speaker is required to examine motions relating to Lords 
messages and amendments at each CCLA stage, and to 
certify any that meet the two-part test. If any such motion is 
put to a division, double majority voting is required.25 Double 
majority voting also applies on certified secondary legislation 
that is put to a division.
Discussion of the double veto
Many of these mechanisms draw on the recommendations 
of the independent McKay Commission (2013), which 
we outlined in chapter 1. However, whereas the McKay 
Commission intended them to facilitate expression of 
England’s voice, they have been adapted by the government 
to provide for a hard veto right. For example, the central 
innovation of the legislative grand committee is very similar 
to the ‘English grand committee’ proposed by the McKay 
Commission. Both mechanisms were intended to debate 
‘consent motions’ but, under the McKay Commission’s 
proposals, the English grand committee’s consent vote was 
intended to be advisory, held prior to the second reading 
stage, allowing the whole House to decide whether or not to 
accept English MPs’ decisions. Likewise, the use of double 
majority voting in the Commons is comparable to the ‘double-
count’ proposed by the McKay Commission – but the McKay 
Commission explicitly rejected the notion that both groups of 
MPs should be required to support the motion for it to pass.
Nevertheless, the double veto system introduced by the 
government does provide more limited rights to English (or 
English and Welsh) MPs than some of the other models 
for EVEL discussed in chapter 1. Most notably, it does not 
go as far as the recommendations of the Commission to 
Strengthen Parliament (2000), which essentially amounted to 
an England-only legislative process on certified legislation. 
It is also arguably more limited than the Conservative 
Democracy Task Force’s (2008) proposals, which restricted 
UK-wide MPs to vetoing the entire bill, rather than (as in the 
current reform) also having the power to amend specific 
legislative provisions.
England-only committee stage
The new standing orders involve one further important 
institutional innovation. If every clause and schedule of a bill 
is certified by the Speaker as relating exclusively to England, 
its committee stage will be taken by a committee composed 
only of MPs representing constituencies in England and 
reflecting the party balance in that part of the UK. No 
comparable provision is made for England and Wales-only 
bills. This aspect of the EVEL system does not constitute a 
veto right for English MPs, because any changes made by 
this committee may in principle be overridden by UK-wide 
MPs at report stage.
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3. Evaluating EVEL
The introduction of EVEL in the Commons has proved highly politically contentious. As yet, 
there is little sign of any prospective cross-party consensus in favour of it, and this partly reflects 
the ingrained suspicion that it is motivated primarily by partisan considerations. Some of the 
complaints about it, however, also reprise more substantive concerns about this type of reform, 
and may also signal a lack of clarity about what precisely EVEL is supposed to achieve.
In this chapter we evaluate the version of EVEL introduced 
by the government in the context of a series of arguments 
made both in support of, and against, such a reform. The 
chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we 
assess two justifications for introducing this kind of change, 
and assess the government’s proposals against them. In the 
second, we evaluate the reform in light of some of the most 
common criticisms that are made against EVEL, including 
by drawing on empirical data we have gathered about how 
EVEL operated during its first 12 months in force. Ultimately, 
we conclude that the system introduced by the government 
can be regarded as a positive innovation, and that some of 
the most common criticisms made of it are at least partially 
answered by the double veto that is central to it. But we also 
argue that the government’s reform suffers from a number 
of more specific weaknesses. These arguments provide 
the basis for chapter 4, in which we make more detailed 
proposals for improving the working of this new system.
The main justifications for EVEL
As discussed in chapter 1, the idea of compensating for 
England’s anomalous status through changes to Westminster 
representation has, in broad terms, commanded increasing 
support in England. But there is a considerable disjuncture 
between support for this general principle and the technical 
challenges associated with its institutionalisation. In this 
section we identify two forms of justification: first, as a 
pragmatic response to new territorial pressures in the wake of 
devolution, designed to bring greater stability to the political 
system and to head off potential English grievance; and, 
second, as a principled commitment to the notion that all 
four parts of the UK should be treated equally in procedural 
terms, and that the English deserve the same basic rights 
of self-government now accorded to other nations within the 
UK. In making this distinction, we are not claiming that these 
two arguments are necessarily mutually exclusive: they are in 
fact often made together. But they do, nevertheless, point in 
subtly different directions in terms of the detailed institutional 
mechanisms which EVEL involves. An important point 
arising from our analysis is that any attempt to introduce this 
constitutional innovation needs to be founded upon a clear 
understanding of the ulterior purpose behind it.
EVEL as a pragmatic response to new pressures
The most widely aired and well established argument for the 
introduction of EVEL focuses on the sense of grievance that 
has been, or might yet be, generated among the English by the 
devolution settlements. Following the introduction of devolution 
elsewhere, England’s anomalous position has become 
more visible. Specific episodes, such as the Commons 
votes highlighted in chapter 1, have played a part in this. But 
it has also occurred through a greater awareness of policy 
divergence across the different parts of the UK, as well as the 
growing conviction among some of the English that devolution 
has cemented the disadvantageous position of England within 
the UK. In the years after its introduction, devolution was often 
framed in the London media in relation to the costs that English 
tax-payers were being asked to bear so that the Scots could 
enjoy benefits such as a more generous healthcare system 
than their counterparts south of the border. And, as we have 
seen, there has been a shift in popular opinion in England on 
aspects of the post-devolved union, including the question of 
voting arrangements at Westminster.
In response to the emergence of this sharper mood in 
England, the argument has increasingly been made that 
further incremental change to the UK’s territorial constitution 
– this time for the English – was now necessary in order 
to protect the stability and integrity of the post-devolution 
constitution. Indeed, several of the proposals for EVEL 
discussed in chapter 1 – in particular those made by Clarke 
and McKay – reflected this kind of argument. Thus, Kenneth 
Clarke’s 2008 proposal for a form of EVEL was justified as a 
failsafe designed to prevent governments passing legislation 
that was fundamentally objectionable to the English. As he 
put it in an interview with one of the authors, conducted in 
2008, this was ‘a sensible constitutional change’ designed to 
‘nip that [English nationalism] in the bud’ and to complete the 
unfinished business of devolution. He added:
If there is, in the middle of what I regard as a load of 
silly attitudes, a genuinely slightly niggling point that 
has substance, then remove it, because there is always 
a risk that something dramatic might happen when 
something very unpopular is imposed on the English by 
a parliament in which the majority of English MPs voted 
against it. (Kenny 2014:223)
In a similar vein, Sir William McKay, chair of the McKay 
Commission, described his commission’s approach as 
being ‘cautiously to move forward. We never thought we 
were rewriting the constitution for the next two centuries, 
just getting round the corner that we are at’ (Scottish Affairs 
Committee 2015b:13).
The idea that some form of pragmatic rebalancing was 
needed has been quite widely echoed. Former First Minister 
for Scotland Henry McLeish, in his evidence to the Calman 
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In its purest form, this justification leads towards demands 
for a more symmetrical devolution settlement across the UK. 
For some, it underpins an argument for the establishment of 
an English parliament and executive, on the basis that this is 
what other peoples in the UK now enjoy. However, relatively 
few senior Conservatives adopt a purist interpretation of this 
principle, and for most proponents the priority is to deal with 
the potential for English disadvantage rather than achieve 
symmetry – a goal which is widely viewed as incompatible 
with the survival of the UK. This kind of argument has 
underpinned calls for a particularly robust version of EVEL. 
Conservative backbencher John Redwood, for example, has 
argued that as a component of ‘justice for all parts of the UK 
in a new settlement’, England-only legislation should now be 
dealt with only by English MPs. The question of procedural 
fairness was central to his case:
In a world in which the Scottish Parliament gets to vote 
on how all the money for Scottish local government 
should be allocated by Council and function, surely 
English MPs should have the same power over the lump 
sum that the UK Parliament has voted for English local 
government?  As the Scottish Parliament makes all 
the decisions on the NHS in Scotland once the overall 
budget has been set by the UK Parliament, shouldn’t 
English MPs alone make similar decisions for the English 
NHS?26
This sort of justification potentially leads in a rather different 
direction to the incrementalist one outlined above. In the wake 
of devolution, a new constitutional principle has in many eyes 
been tacitly conceded: the idea of the union as a voluntary 
association of free nations. Whether this understanding 
sits easily with the constitutional tradition of parliamentary 
sovereignty remains a moot point in legal and political terms. 
But the increasingly widespread acceptance of this principle, 
and its application to the English situation, carries important 
legal and constitutional implications. The argument against 
this particular procedural injustice lends itself naturally to an 
attempt to amend parliamentary processes in order to ensure 
that England’s disadvantage is removed. In institutional 
terms, it points towards solutions that seek to eliminate 
the anomalies in rights between the four parts of the UK – 
potentially resulting in institutional solutions that stand at 
some remove from traditional interpretations of parliamentary 
government in the UK. The assertion of the equal treatment 
of all nations within the union is a less familiar, and – for 
the Westminster system – rather heterodox constitutional 
argument. But it has gained considerable credence and 
growing legitimacy within British politics.
Commission in 2008, suggested that the English needed a 
voice, and the current system of asymmetrical devolution 
could no longer be sustained. He argued: ‘We must move 
towards a balanced, quasi-federal framework of which we 
can make sense rather than the English feeling aggrieved 
and their grief and anger spilling over on to us’ (cit. in 
Kenny 2014:209). Similarly, the Scottish Affairs Committee 
in 2006 – then dominated by Scottish MPs and chaired by 
Glasgow Central Labour MP Mohammad Sarwar – reported 
its ‘concern’ at ‘signs that English discontent’ in relation to 
the West Lothian Question, and recorded its ‘hope that the 
matter will be comprehensively debated, and resolved, before 
the situation is reached whereby it could actually undermine 
the whole devolution settlement’ (Scottish Affairs Committee 
2006:15).
Those who have made this kind of precautionary case 
for reform have tended also to be mindful that, although 
there may be benefits to change, there may also be risks 
to achieving it in a way that infringes some of the long-
established conventions and practices of the UK parliament. 
On this view, it is vital that any such reform appears 
consonant with the ethos of the House, and represents an 
evolution of its practice – rather than the introduction of an 
alien set of rules that might jeopardise its standing as a 
union-wide chamber and impinge upon the equality of all 
its members. Broadly put, this kind of argument is entirely 
congruent with the whiggish commitment to evolutionary, 
adaptive change that has been central to the ethos of the 
British parliamentary system, and has been used on various 
prior occasions to justify important reforms to the voting 
system or parliamentary practice. In this sense, EVEL can be, 
and has been, presented as a measure designed to ensure 
the longer term stability of the union.
EVEL as principled commitment to procedural equality
A subtly different justification for EVEL evokes a different 
principle. Rather than treating EVEL as an incremental 
adjustment designed to stave off real or anticipated grievance, 
this perspective is committed to reform as a way of ensuring 
procedural equality between the four parts of the UK. On this 
view, devolution has resulted in the three non-English parts of 
the UK being accorded institutions and rights – most visibly, 
in separate legislatures and executives – that England has 
hitherto been denied. Moreover, devolution is seen to have 
compromised the integrity of the UK-level institutions that 
govern England by removing the reciprocity that previously 
characterised territorial relations between the different parts 
of the UK. The West Lothian Question is a totemic example 
of this new relationship. According to this perspective, while 
there may have been only a small number of cases when the 
West Lothian anomaly has become apparent, its persistence 
represents a considerable infringement of English rights, and 
symbolises for many the state’s indifference to the interests 
of its majority English population. The moral case for change 
here is less about the perils of inaction, and much more about 
a demand for procedural justice.
26   John Redwood, ‘England wants to get EVEN. Now Hague must ensure that it does’, Conservative Home, 2 February 2015,  
http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2015/02/john-redwood-mp-england-wants-to-get-even-now-hague-must-ensure-that-it-does.html [accessed on 
29 September 2016].
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Evaluating arguments for EVEL
Broadly put, these represent two distinct justifications for 
introducing some variant of EVEL. In practice advocates 
frequently draw on, or mix aspects of, both, and they may 
also derive different institutional conclusions from the same 
principle. But there are some connections between argument 
and institutional preference which are notable, and have 
been a recurrent pattern in these debates. The first kind of 
justification points towards a reform that is intended to remain 
congruent with the established ethos and conventions of 
parliament. The second tends to allow space for a more 
wholesale solution which is intended to reflect the overriding 
goal of procedural equality for England.
Cameron’s statement on the morning after the referendum 
can be interpreted as broadly consistent with the 
precautionary approach associated with the first justification 
identified above. Such thinking continued to flow into the 
case made by government, as for instance when Chris 
Grayling, then Leader of the Commons, contended that EVEL 
represented a ‘relatively modest step that […] provides a 
balance of fairness across the Union’.27
Yet, the second kind of justification has also made an 
appearance in the government’s case. In his speech after 
the Scottish independence referendum result, Cameron 
drew attention to procedural asymmetry, arguing that ‘just 
as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on 
their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as 
well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on 
these issues’.28 This kind of argument has been accompanied 
by the suggestion that the English now deserved their own 
devolution, which EVEL has now delivered. For example, 
Chris Grayling argued in the Commons that EVEL would 
‘enable us to give an answer to the West Lothian question and 
to our constituents by saying that England will have its own 
piece of the devolution settlement’.29 But such a conviction, 
which borrows more from the second position outlined above, 
is arguably out of kilter with the kind of reform which the 
government envisaged, and which it has delivered.
Strictly speaking, EVEL does not eliminate the West Lothian 
anomaly. To do so would require the establishment of an 
English body comparable to the devolved legislatures – for 
example an English parliament – with the power to pass, 
and not only to block, legislation for England. Instead, 
EVEL implements the more modest ambition of a veto right. 
Rather than being equivalent to devolution itself, this veto 
right is comparable to one specific element of the devolved 
settlements: the ‘Sewel convention’, under which the UK 
parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters 
without the consent of the devolved bodies. This is given 
expression through the practice of the devolved legislatures 
passing ‘legislative consent motions’ to signal assent to 
Westminster legislating in devolved areas. EVEL is best 
understood as an attempt to mirror this specific element 
of devolution, by allowing English (or English and Welsh) 
representatives similarly to consent to decisions taken at the 
UK level – although, unlike in the Sewel convention, there is 
within EVEL no explicit acknowledgement that this veto right 
should apply only ‘normally’.
This basic lack of clarity about what EVEL is designed to 
achieve, and the tendency to muddle the precautionary 
argument for incremental change with more ambitious 
rhetoric about some kind of equivalent devolution for England, 
has done much to cloud understanding of the nature of, and 
rationale for, the new procedures. A tendency to ‘over claim’ 
regarding the implications and character of EVEL may well 
store up difficulties of expectation and understanding over the 
longer term.
One further feature of arguments for EVEL is also worthy of 
note. Debate about the English Question, and its potential 
resolution, has tended to lean heavily on the assumption that 
the legislative process is the place where concerns about 
English representation and governance can best be addressed 
(hence the widely held assumption that solving the West 
Lothian Question is the most effective way to answer the much 
wider English Question). Yet the anomalies associated with 
the UK’s devolution settlement extend far beyond voting rights 
in the legislature. Indeed, given that a good deal of the actual 
governance of England is undertaken by the departments 
of central government (as well as a variety of local, city, 
county and regional authorities), there is much to be said 
for broadening the focus of any enquiry into how England is 
governed beyond the West Lothian conundrum. It may well be 
that the new system of EVEL is a prelude to arguments about 
additional changes to the way in which England is governed, 
and not just how legislation is produced. Such a focus might 
lead to the consideration of reforms directed at processes 
and institutions that lie further ‘upstream’ in the governing 
process – including, for instance, the remit, operation and 
naming of Whitehall departments whose remit is effectively 
English only. The current and previous government’s interest 
in decentralising some powers to authorities within England is 
also an important aspect of this agenda.
Seeking to provide a legislative veto is, however, also clearly 
important – in part because West Lothian-related anomalies 
may drain the well of tacit consent upon which the legitimacy of 
the Westminster parliament depends. Ensuring that the English 
feel that there are spaces for their representatives to consider 
issues that impact in distinct and substantive ways upon 
England ought to be a clearer ambition for any system of EVEL 
– a point to which we return below.
More generally, there is a strong case for the government 
clarifying its overarching goals in relation to this new 
system, and linking these more clearly to the changes it has 
introduced. Some of the confusion which attaches to the new 
standing orders may be the result of a lack of clarity about 
purpose and communication on the government’s part. Over 
the longer term, EVEL will come to be more widely understood 
and accepted if its introduction is informed by a clear account 
of the merits and purposes of the union and also the need 
for a clearer English dimension within its political structures. 
But presenting the new veto as a complete equivalent to 
devolution elsewhere is both misleading and likely to generate 
expectations that cannot be met. Instead, depicting EVEL 
as one element within an evolving constitutional system 
would better establish in the popular mind, and among 
MPs, the purposes, remit and potential limits of these new 
27   HC Deb 15 July 2015, column 940.
28   ‘Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister’, 19 September 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/scottish-independence-
referendum-statement-by-the-prime-minister [accessed on 29 September 2016].
29   HC Deb 22 October 2015, column 1184.
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procedures. Indeed, making and communicating a clear, 
principled argument for EVEL is in some ways as important as 
recalibrating its precise design and application.
Evaluating arguments against EVEL
In addition to these arguments in support of reform, EVEL has 
been the subject of a series of objections – both of principle 
and in relation to some of the specific features of the scheme 
introduced by the government. While the majority of EVEL’s 
critics contend that the government’s reform goes too far in 
its institutionalisation of an English veto, a minority make the 
opposite case. It is beyond the scope of this report to evaluate 
every possible objection to EVEL. Instead, we focus on five of 
the most important and familiar complaints: that its operation 
will inevitably politicise the office of the Commons Speaker; 
that it has created two classes of MP; that it will undermine 
UK-level government; that it has failed to facilitate expression 
of England’s voice; and that the procedures as implemented 
are unnecessarily complex. In assessing these objections we 
draw on a range of evidence, including empirical data about 
how EVEL worked during its first 12 months of operation.
Politicisation of the Speaker
An obvious place to begin is with the certification process, 
through which the Speaker identifies legislation on which the 
EVEL procedures should apply. Given the fears that some 
critics have about the consequences of EVEL for parliament 
and government (which we will turn to below), it has been 
argued that the certification process might politicise the office 
of Speaker, potentially compromising his or her ability to act 
as an impartial arbiter of debate in that chamber. The SNP’s 
Pete Wishart, for example, has argued that the Speaker’s 
responsibility to certify legislation will place him in an 
‘intolerable and politically invidious situation’.30
In broad terms, certification may well place the Speaker in 
an uncomfortable position. MPs from across the UK may 
feel very strongly that a specific provision should – or should 
not – be certified as relating exclusively to a particular 
territorial area. But it is also important to emphasise that the 
office of Speaker already requires extensive, and sometimes 
contentious, political judgement, and Commons procedures 
place considerable authority in the hands of its occupant. As 
a consequence, the Speaker routinely takes decisions that 
have a substantive effect on proceedings and outcomes, 
including: the selection, or not, of amendments (which can 
in principle affect the final text agreed by the Commons); 
the granting of urgent questions; and the certification of 
legislation as a ‘money bill’ (which severely limits the ability 
of the Lords to scrutinise it). Requiring the Speaker to 
certify legislation under EVEL may be a different order of 
responsibility, in that it affects the voting rights of a territorially-
based subset of MPs; but it does not appear to represent a 
fundamental breach with established practice.
During EVEL’s first 12 months of operation, the Speaker certified 
provisions of nine bills. This represents around half of the 20 bills 
that were eligible to be considered for certification. As shown 
in Table 6, the extent of certification varied significantly across 
bills, ranging – at the initial certification prior to second reading 
– from just one clause on the Energy Bill, to 148 clauses and 
schedules on the Housing and Planning Bill, and all 17 clauses 
of the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill. Once 
broken down into individual certifiable units of legislation, over 
a fifth of clauses and schedules were certified prior to second 
reading. In addition to primary legislation, the Speaker certified 
around 30 pieces of secondary legislation (listed in Appendix 
B), representing approximately a fifth of all affirmative statutory 
instruments laid before the Commons during this period.31 
These figures make clear that a significant minority of legislative 
provisions have been certified by the Speaker, and that on 
certain bills certification was extensive.
30   HC Deb 2 July 2015, column 1651.
31   Only those statutory instruments subject to the affirmative procedure (of which 29 were certified) are automatically considered for certification.













Housing and Planning Bill 156 148 95% E, EW
Childcare Bill 9 3 33% E
Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill 17 17 100% EW
Energy Bill 86 1 1% EW
Enterprise Bill 44 6 14% E, EW
Policing and Crime Bill 124 69 56% E, EW
Finance (No. 2) Bill 204 10 5% EWNI
Higher Education and Research Bill 125 8 6% E
Neighbourhood Planning Bill 38 32 84% E, EW
All eligible bills (20 in total) 1317 294 22% E, EW, EWNI
     
Key: E (England), EW (England and Wales), EWNI (England, Wales and Northern Ireland). 
Notes: Bills listed are those with provisions certified. Eligible bills are those that were eligible to be considered by the Speaker for 
certification. Ineligible bills include those whose Commons second reading took place before 23 October 2015, private members’ bills, 
and Consolidated Fund or Appropriation Bills. Figures also exclude bills that were not considered for certification by 22 October 2016. 
Data refers to the version of the bill as introduced in the Commons or brought from the Lords, and to the initial certification prior to 
second reading.
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Despite this, the Speaker’s decisions have not, during the 
first 12 months of EVEL’s operation, provoked any significant 
controversy. On a very small number of occasions MPs 
sought to clarify on the floor of the House the rationale 
behind the Speaker’s certification decisions – in particular 
Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh and Lady Sylvia Hermon at different 
stages of the Housing and Planning Bill.32 Yet on neither 
occasion did these questions develop into serious political 
disquiet. Subsequently, MPs expressed concerns about 
how EVEL was applied on particular pieces of legislation, 
often related to indirect effects of the legislation upon 
other parts of the UK.33 On the Charities (Protection and 
Social Investment) Bill, for instance, Lady Sylvia Hermon 
argued that many charities operating in her constituency in 
Northern Ireland had their headquarters in England, with the 
implication that they (and consequently her constituents) 
would be affected by the legislation.34 However, these have 
generally been presented as objections to the principle of 
EVEL itself rather than to the Speaker’s conduct in certifying 
legislation. In his evidence to the Commons Procedure 
Committee in October 2016, Pete Wishart acknowledged 
that ‘thus far there has been no issue because I believe 
the Speaker has gone about this business diligently and 
responsibly’ (Commons Procedure Committee 2016:5).
That the Speaker has not during this period found his 
decisions to be the focus of political controversy is partly a 
reflection of broader factors: so far the legislation certified 
has not been the subject of serious territorially-based political 
disagreement, and the current composition of the House 
means that certification decisions were unlikely in any case 
to affect legislative outcomes. But it is also in part because 
the Speaker’s authority is well established within the ethos of 
the Commons. Thus far there are few signs that certification 
decisions will damage the Speaker’s standing, even where 
MPs disapprove of the EVEL procedures.
An additional important observation concerns the Speaker’s 
decisions themselves. On a number of occasions, the 
Speaker has arrived at different conclusions to those 
anticipated in published government advice. The most 
extensive disagreement occurred on the Higher Education 
and Research Bill. The government’s explanatory notes 
indicated that 71 of this bill’s 125 clauses and schedules 
prior to second reading met the two-part certification test; 
in fact, the Speaker certified only eight of them. The reason 
for this disagreement centred on whether an ‘English higher 
education provider’ – defined in the bill as a provider whose 
activities are carried out ‘principally’ in England – met the test 
of applying only to England. The Childcare Bill was similarly 
expected by government to be certified as wholly England-
only, but the Speaker certified only particular clauses. In this 
case, the cause of disagreement with the government was 
that the bill contained provision relating to HMRC on which, 
as a reserved matter, a devolved legislature could not have 
made comparable provision. We are aware of similar apparent 
discrepancies between the government’s advice and the 
Speaker’s certification decision on the Housing and Planning 
Bill,35 the Enterprise Bill,36 the Policing and Crime Bill,37 and 
the Digital Economy Bill.38
These early disagreements are important for two main 
reasons. First, they show that certification decisions 
are sometimes going to be hard to make. Indeed, such 
decisions may well become more complicated as the UK’s 
devolution settlements continue to expand and evolve. 
Written rules always require a degree of interpretation when 
applied to real-life scenarios, and so it is unsurprising that 
differences of opinion have occurred. The potential for 
future disagreement is therefore real, and there is nothing 
in principle to prevent this arising on legislation that is 
the focus of intense political controversy. Second, the 
first year of EVEL’s operation has helped demonstrate the 
impartiality and independence of the Speaker as a neutral 
arbiter of the system. When EVEL was first implemented, 
some questioned whether the government’s publication 
of advice on the territorial application of legislation might 
mean, in effect, that ‘the Speaker will be asked maybe 
just to rubber stamp’ government decisions (Pete Wishart 
in Scottish Affairs Committee 2015a:11) – a situation that 
would have potentially resulted in the extension of executive 
influence over the legislature. As yet there is no sign that this 
has happened, and this may serve to protect the office of 
Speaker against future politicisation.
A related concern expressed by some is that the Speaker’s 
decisions may be open to a different kind of pressure as a 
result of legal challenges. Parliamentary proceedings are 
protected from interference by the courts under Article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights. Indeed, one of the main justifications given 
for implementing EVEL through standing orders, rather than 
by legislation, was the fear that the latter might increase 
the possibility of the operation of these rules becoming 
subject to judicial review.39 Yet some commentators have 
argued that, even under the existing standing orders, the 
possibility of judicial interference is not entirely eliminated. 
This is largely because one of the two components of 
the certification test centres on whether a policy area is 
devolved to another part of the UK. This assessment is 
far more legally contestable than is sometimes assumed, 
potentially involving interpretations of convention rights and 
(for the time being) EU law. In relation to cases involving 
the devolved legislatures, disagreements over legislative 
competence may ultimately be referred to the Supreme 
Court.40 Even if the Speaker’s decisions were not directly 
challenged, it has been suggested that a court decision 
32   HC Deb 2 November 2015, column 719; 12 January 2016, column 805.
33   E.g. Alan Brown, HC Deb 2 November 2015, column 747; Patrick Grady, HC Deb 19 January 2016, column 1308; Hywel Williams, HC Deb 19 January 2016, 
column 1312; Lady Sylvia Hermon, HC Deb 25 January 2016, column 75.
34   HC Deb 26 January 2016, column 228.
35   Initial certification on clauses 59, 71, 85 and 108-110; post-report certification on new schedule 3; and CCLA certification on Lords amendments 22 and 111.
36   Initial certification on clause 25.
37   Initial certification on clauses 28, 35, 63, 71 and 72; and post-report certification on clauses 7, 44 and 79.
38  Initial certification on clause 38.
39   Chris Grayling, HC Deb 7 July 2015, column 197.
40  Most notably, the Supreme Court ruled, in opposition to the assessment of the UK government, that the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill 2013 was within the 
competence of the National Assembly for Wales.
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could reveal a Speaker’s certificate to have relied on an 
interpretation at variance with subsequent case law.
But the consensus among our interviewees was that direct 
challenge of the Speaker’s rulings is unlikely. And it is worth 
noting that the double veto may provide an additional layer 
of protection that further limits the possibility of this scenario. 
This is because certified legislation continues to require 
majority support among all UK MPs, even where EVEL 
requires that English (or English and Welsh) MPs must also 
consent to it. Consequently, were the Speaker to take a 
decision subsequently contradicted in the courts, it is only 
possible for this certification decision to have resulted in 
legislation not having been passed by parliament when it 
would otherwise have been. Except in relation to the specific 
anomalies we highlight in chapter 4, EVEL cannot result in 
parliament passing legislation that it would otherwise have 
rejected. Moreover, any decision made by a legislative 
grand committee would subsequently have been effectively 
endorsed by the whole House at the bill’s third reading. As a 
result, we are sceptical about the likelihood of the Speaker’s 
decisions being directly challenged in the courts.
Two classes of MP
A second complaint widely made about EVEL concerns the 
implications of providing a subset of MPs with the right to veto 
legislation made by the whole House. There has long been 
a fear that such a shift would infringe one of the foundational 
tenets of the union parliament: that all MPs have equal status 
and voting rights.
While the provision of a veto for English (or English and 
Welsh) MPs might be considered by some to be a pragmatic 
adjustment to devolution, it is also undeniable that it 
represents a significant departure from established practice 
at Westminster. It is worth noting that EVEL is not the first 
occasion when some MPs have been accorded special rights 
based on the geographical location of their constituency.41 
Nor is it the first moment when participation in specific 
divisions has been restricted to particular MPs: divisions in 
committees of the House are routinely restricted to members 
of the committee, for example on public bill committees. But 
what does appear to be significant about these procedures 
is that they provide geographical subsets of the House with a 
potentially binding negative vote: if English MPs wish to veto 
a certified clause, the whole House cannot, under the terms 
of the standing orders, overturn that decision. It is because 
of this that opponents have argued that EVEL establishes 
‘two classes of Members of Parliament’,42 ‘second-class 
MPs’,43 or even ‘fourth-class citizens’ of the Commons.44 As 
a consequence, concerns have been expressed that EVEL 
might result in non-English MPs having a ‘a second-class 
say’ on matters that affect their constituents, on the basis that 
England-only legislation backed by the whole House may 
nevertheless be vetoed by a majority of MPs representing 
English constituencies – even if that legislation has indirect 
consequences outside of England.45
During the first year of EVEL’s operation, no division 
conducted using its procedures produced a different result 
than would otherwise have applied, as is apparent in Table 
7. This finding, however, needs to be understood in relation 
to the current political composition of the Commons and the 
nature of the legislation that has come before it. In order to 
assess the force of this particular objection, it is therefore 
necessary to look beyond the empirical evidence about 
how EVEL has so far operated, and consider some of the 
arguments over principle which it involves.
41   For instance, the Commons standing orders state that the Scottish grand committee ‘shall consist of all Members representing Scottish constituencies’ 
(Standing Order No. 93(1)).
42  Wayne David, HC Deb 7 July 2015, column 228.
43  Alan Brown, HC Deb 22 October 2015, column 1223.
44  Angus MacNeil HC Deb 15 July 2015, column 975. The ‘fourth-class’ is presumably a reference to Scottish Members not being included in any of the three 
territorial areas to which legislation may be certified.
45  Ian C. Lucas, HC Deb 22 October 2015, column 1206.
Table 7: Number of Commons divisions subject to EVEL, October 2015-October 2016
Number of 
divisions





Divisions in legislative grand committee 0 0 N/A
Double majority divisions at CCLA 9 0 E, EW
Double majority divisions on other business 5 0 E, EW
Total 14 0 E, EW
Key: E (England), EW (England and Wales). 
Note: Data covers period from 23 October 2015 to 22 October 2016.
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The question of whether EVEL has created two classes 
of MP – particularly when viewed against the backdrop of 
a representative system that is already asymmetrical – is 
one that continues to attract debate. However, a central 
characteristic of the new standing orders, as indicated above, 
is that that they implement a double veto. While this does not 
necessarily rebut the argument that EVEL has created two 
classes of MP, it does mean that MPs from outside England 
(or England and Wales) are in no weaker a position to block 
legislative changes than they were previously: all legislation 
continues to require the backing of the whole House. They 
are, however, in a weaker position to force through legislation 
that applies only in England (or England and Wales) against 
the wishes of English (or English and Welsh) MPs.
Two cases during the current parliament illustrate the 
implications of the double veto very well. In July 2015 the 
government laid before parliament secondary legislation 
to relax fox hunting rules in England and Wales,46 but a 
planned debate, to be followed by a vote to approve the 
legislation, was cancelled after the SNP confirmed that its 
MPs would oppose the move. Although this issue unfolded 
before EVEL came into force, the fact that the government 
did not subsequently return to the matter illustrates that this 
new process would not have enabled it to circumvent the 
SNP’s opposition. The government ran into similar problems 
when attempting to relax Sunday trading rules in England 
and Wales through the Enterprise Bill. A Commons vote in 
March 2016 revealed majority support for the Sunday trading 
provisions among English and Welsh MPs, but not across 
the whole House, with opposition from Scottish MPs proving 
decisive.47 As with the fox hunting vote, the EVEL procedures 
did not in fact apply, this time because the proposal had 
been drafted in such a way that it failed to meet the two-part 
certification test. Yet, even if the provision had been drafted 
differently, the legislation could not have been forced through 
by English and Welsh MPs: the double veto meant that the 
support of the whole House remained essential. It may well 
be that the limitations of the double veto will surface again in a 
future vote on the government’s policy on grammar schools.
Certain policy decisions undoubtedly have consequences 
that carry across national borders. So, for example, Welsh 
constituents who live close to a border might be dependent 
on public services, such as a medical facility, that is 
located in England. But it is worth noting that the devolution 
settlements are premised on the understanding that direct 
effects have a special status. Some English constituents 
living close to a border are likewise reliant on public services 
operated by a devolved administration, yet are unable to 
elect representatives to influence those policy decisions. It 
is therefore hard to argue against an arrangement that gives 
priority to the direct effects of legislation. Indeed, at the level 
of principle, the insistence that even indirect effects in other 
territories necessarily invalidate any attempt to delineate 
legislation primarily applicable to England (or England 
and Wales) is questionable. Such an argument erodes the 
possibility of creating a meaningful distinction between direct 
and indirect consequences. There may well be good reasons 
to deal with direct consequences as a matter of urgency or 
priority, and to regard indirect ones as still important, but 
potentially secondary in kind. Equally this kind of argument 
supports a long established indifference to another ‘right’ that 
is at stake here: that of English constituents whose interests 
can be overridden by legislators from other parts of the UK 
who are not accountable to them. At the same time, the 
disproportionate size of England relative to the other parts 
of the UK means that indirect effects from England are likely 
to have a greater impact on the non-English parts than vice 
versa, and the double veto provides an important protection to 
the non-English territories on this score.
One particularly contentious kind of cross-border effect 
concerns the so-called ‘Barnett consequentials’ generated by 
some legislation, whereby public spending in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland is adjusted by reference to spending 
in England under the ‘Barnett formula’. The argument 
here is that policy decisions that affect the overall levels of 
spending in England may have financial implications for 
the other parts of the UK, and that it is therefore imperative 
for MPs from those territories to have the opportunity to 
vote on such matters. The First Minister of Wales, Carwyn 
Jones, has pointed to a hypothetical scenario in which a UK 
government’s introduction a different funding model for the 
English NHS would result in a lower overall level of public 
spending and thus reduce the funding of the devolved bodies 
via the Barnett formula (Constitution Committee 2016:16). This 
is a particularly difficult form of cross-border effect, since it 
concerns consequences that are by definition not reciprocal, 
in that decisions taken by the devolved legislatures have no 
equivalent effect on English spending.
The extent to which the Barnett consequentials represent a 
meaningful objection to EVEL remains disputed, and they 
have been described by the former Leader of the House 
Chris Grayling as ‘an illusion and a side issue’ (Commons 
Procedure Committee 2015b:33). Strictly speaking, legislation 
on English policy matters does not directly change the overall 
level of expenditure in England (or, by extension, spending 
in other parts of the UK). As Gallagher (2012, 2015) correctly 
observes, government spending is authorised through 
the annual estimates and supply process, and indeed any 
spending commitment arising from policy legislation could, in 
principle, be met by reducing expenditure elsewhere (which 
might not necessarily require legislation) rather than through 
increasing overall expenditure levels. Moreover, the Barnett 
formula is an administrative mechanism and has ‘no legal or 
constitutional status’ (Gallagher 2012:23). Nevertheless, we 
disagree with the implication that Barnett consequentials are 
therefore irrelevant. It seems to us that legislative decisions 
can potentially carry consequences for overall levels of 
spending and, although spending is formally authorised 
through a separate process, the estimates process does 
not make it possible for MPs to increase the overall amount 
proposed by the government.48 This means that legislation 
in fact provides the only real opportunity that MPs have to 
vote against a proposal that might well reduce the level of 
spending available to a devolved administration.
46   The Draft Hunting Act 2004 (Exempt Hunting) (Amendment) Order 2015.
47   For further discussion see Daniel Gover and Michael Kenny, ‘Sunday trading and the limits of EVEL’, Constitution Unit blog, 10 March 2016, https://constitution-
unit.com/2016/03/10/sunday-trading-and-the-limits-of-evel/ [accessed on 29 September 2016].
48   Erskine May states: ‘In accordance with the principle that only the Crown can initiate expenditure, no amendment to an Estimates motion is in order which 
seeks to increase a total amount sought’ (Erskine May 24th edn. 2011:738).
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Even so, we do not conclude that the Barnett consequentials 
objection is ultimately convincing. This is because of the 
specific design of the version of EVEL introduced by the 
government, and in particular the incorporation of a double 
veto. As shown above, under this principle, certified legislation 
must be approved by both English (or English and Welsh) 
and UK-wide MPs for it to pass into law. MPs from outside 
England are therefore in no weaker a position under EVEL 
to block legislation that applies exclusively to England than 
they were previously. Returning to Carwyn Jones’ example, a 
proposal to reduce public spending on the English NHS could 
be vetoed by the whole House (including its Welsh members), 
even if English MPs supported the policy.
A second difficult type of cross-border effect concerns the 
financial implications of English tax decisions. Under EVEL, 
provisions of the Finance Bill (which legislates for taxation) 
can be certified as relating to one of three territorial areas 
within the UK. However, as Gallagher (2015) observes, if a 
subset of MPs vetoes a certified tax provision, this may result 
in government adjusting expenditure in ways that affect the 
other part(s) of the UK (for example through a reduction in 
spending on reserved policy matters that apply to all four 
nations). As such, taxation decisions taken by one subset of 
MPs may spill over into spending consequences for other 
parts. The double veto does not protect against this form of 
indirect effect.
The provision of special veto rights to a subset of MPs within 
the union parliament does undoubtedly represent a significant 
constitutional development, and it does have the potential 
to disrupt existing parliamentary arrangements.  And these 
aspects of EVEL need to be more fully acknowledged. But 
some of the concerns that are routinely raised against this 
change do not appear to be borne out. The government’s 
decision to retain the right of all MPs to vote down legislation 
represents an important protection against some of these 
worries, offering a vital bulwark against the allocation of 
different substantive rights to different groups of MPs. And it 
is for this reason that we would suggest that the government 
consider very carefully elements of the new system that are 
potentially inconsistent with this foundational principle, a 
matter we return to in chapter 4.
Undermining UK government
The provision of special voting rights to a subset of MPs 
has given rise to a third major criticism: that EVEL risks 
undermining the integrity of UK-level government. In this vein, 
it has been argued that under the EVEL standing orders, ‘if 
a Government do not command a majority in England, it is 
doubtful that they could actually govern’.49 It is not possible 
to assess this against empirical data relating to the new 
system’s first 12 months of operation, as during this period 
the government commanded a larger majority among English 
MPs than across the whole House.
In the UK’s parliamentary system, the government is 
accountable to, and ultimately dependent for its survival 
upon, parliament (and in particular the House of Commons). 
Any alteration to the voting rights of particular groups of MPs 
on some parts of the legislative programme would mean that 
the size of the government’s majority could vary depending 
on the policy area and its territorial application. Indeed, it is 
conceivable that one party could have a majority on some 
policy issues, and another on others. This has fed the fears of 
some commentators that EVEL might result in different parties 
being required to govern on different issues – a situation 
which constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor (2009) labels 
the ‘bifurcation’ of government. He posits a scenario in which 
‘[m]inisters would have to switch rapidly to the opposition front 
bench when an English matter was under discussion, while 
the opposition front benchers would come to take their places 
on the ministerial benches’ (Bogdanor 2009:102).
The possibility of this extreme form of ‘bifurcated’ government, 
in which an opposition with a majority of English MPs might 
effectively become the government in England, seems 
unlikely. This is particularly because it is hard to imagine 
an opposition party claiming the privileges of government 
within the Commons procedures. Even under the existing 
procedures, the government has various mechanisms it can 
employ to prevent the passage of legislation it opposes, 
including by denying it the Commons time it needs. Moreover, 
EVEL applies only on government-sponsored bills, and 
the government can restrict the potential for certain hostile 
amendments (or even potentially avoid certification) through 
the careful drafting of a bill. It also retains the power to 
withdraw its legislation if necessary. The double veto provides 
the government with further tools, as it means that the whole 
House – in which the UK government would presumably have 
a majority – would be able to block any specific amendments 
supported by the English majority. A UK government would 
only find itself unable to fend off such amendments if it were 
unable to marshal a majority of the whole House against them. 
But this would have been the situation irrespective of EVEL.
A more plausible scenario is that a UK government without 
a majority in England (or with a very slim majority there) may 
find itself unable to pass key aspects of its legislative agenda 
on England-only policy areas, such as health and education. 
The double veto does not protect against this eventuality. In 
such circumstances, it is likely that a UK government would 
be required to compromise on its legislative programme 
because of the balance of opinion among English 
representatives. In principle, this is little different to a situation 
in which a government lacks a majority among the whole 
House, and may indeed lead to the kinds of bargaining 
that might be seen as a welcome bulwark upon executive 
power. How effectively such an arrangement would work in 
practice, particularly given Westminster’s often adversarial 
political culture, remains difficult to predict. A UK opposition 
with a majority in England could, if it so wished, make it very 
difficult for a UK government to legislate for England, and 
there is a risk that this could prove politically destabilising. 
Nevertheless, as Gallagher (2015) has argued, it is also the 
case that an inability to pass new primary legislation would 
not necessarily prevent a UK government from actually 
governing England, under powers conferred by existing 
legislation. Were the government to find itself unable to 
govern, it would also retain the ability to ask UK-wide MPs to 
suspend or even revoke the EVEL standing orders.
49   Angela Eagle, HC Deb 15 July 2015, column 955.
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There is, however, an important possible circumstance 
in which EVEL could pose even more serious difficulties 
for the UK government. As Gallagher (2015) observes, 
certain legislation effectively lapses if it is not regularly 
renewed by parliament. This is the case on certain types 
of secondary legislation, as well as income tax decisions 
that are implemented through Finance Bills. On such types 
of business, Gallagher argues that the provision of a veto 
means that a subset of MPs could effectively hold the UK 
government to ‘ransom’, as the exercise of a veto would result 
not in maintenance of the status quo but in there being no 
legislation at all. In the case of income tax, this would be 
highly destabilising, and suspension of the procedures might 
here prove the only solution. We return to this point in the 
subsequent chapter.
A separate, though related, concern raised by some 
about EVEL’s impact on the UK government is that it might 
undermine the possibility of MPs from outside England 
holding key UK government positions, including the office 
of prime minister. It has been claimed that the provision 
of special voting rights to English MPs casts doubt on the 
legitimacy of an MP from outside that area leading the 
UK government that is ultimately responsible for English 
legislation. Hence, during the 2016 Conservative party 
leadership election, one anonymous party figure apparently 
briefed the media on the ‘constitutional problem’ of Stephen 
Crabb being elected: ‘[a]s a Welsh MP, he can’t vote for 
English-only laws’.50 Similarly, Scottish government minister 
Fiona Hyslop has argued that, ‘[p]olitically, you could not 
effectively in practice have a Scottish Member of Parliament 
ever becoming Prime Minister’ (Constitution Committee 
2015:19).
In assessing this claim, it is important to distinguish between 
the EVEL procedures themselves and any wider political 
dynamics. In terms of the former, EVEL does not make it 
procedurally more difficult for an MP from outside England 
to become prime minister. The office of prime minister is 
held by the person judged to command the confidence of 
the House of Commons. This is determined chiefly by the 
political balance across the House of Commons, and EVEL 
does not disrupt this principle. Nor does EVEL affect the 
usual functions of the premiership: EVEL primarily concerns 
the passage of legislation, and the prime minister is not 
typically involved in piloting legislation through the Commons. 
In terms of the wider political situation, however, it is clear 
that the territorial dimensions of British politics have become 
increasingly prominent in recent years, and this may factor 
into the decisions parties make when they elect their leaders. 
It is possible that EVEL may reinforce this political trend, to 
the extent that the certification process makes explicit that 
certain legislation applies only in England. But it should also 
be recognised that the normative principles that underpin 
EVEL – particularly as expressed through the double veto – 
do actually affirm that even certified legislation is of legitimate 
interest of all UK MPs. The claim that an MP from outside 
England has no right to lead a government that legislates for 
England is therefore significantly at odds with the rationale 
behind the EVEL procedures.
A lack of voice for England
A fourth criticism is that EVEL has failed to facilitate expression 
of England’s ‘voice’ in parliament. This complaint has so 
far been less widely aired in popular debate, but is in our 
estimation one of the most serious potential weaknesses of 
the new system. The distinction between voice and veto was 
central to the McKay Commission’s report, and was highlighted 
in a subsequent report by Roger Gough and Andrew Tyrie 
(2015) for the Centre for Policy Studies.
Speaking on the morning after the Scottish independence 
referendum in September 2014, David Cameron contended 
that ‘now the millions of voices of England must also be 
heard’. He went on to connect this idea to ‘the so-called West 
Lothian question’ and the right of English (alongside Welsh 
and Northern Irish) representatives to vote separately on policy 
decisions that apply only in those parts of the UK.51 In making 
this argument, Cameron essentially conflated the case for 
providing England with a voice with that for veto. It is certainly 
reasonable to see a close connection between them, and 
indeed voting may be one of the mechanisms through which 
voice is expressed. But it is in fact much harder than is usually 
realised to promote both through a single institutional reform.
Following Cameron’s lead, the EVEL procedures have 
effectively prioritised veto over the establishment of a 
deliberative space for the English. This is apparent from 
a consideration of the operation of the new legislative 
grand committee stage introduced by the new procedures. 
As already noted, the McKay Commission (2013:55) 
recommended the establishment of a very similar mechanism 
– an English grand committee stage – and argued that ‘few 
other procedures would demonstrate more clearly outside the 
House what was being done to meet the demand’. Under the 
McKay Commission’s recommendations, this stage would 
have been held prior to second reading, rendering it the site 
of the first Commons debate on any affected bill. In order to 
bolt down a comprehensive veto right, however, under the 
current system the equivalent stages are held at the end of a 
bill’s Commons passage, when most scrutiny and debate has 
already taken place.
There has consequently been very little demand to conduct 
any substantive debate in these English stages. Indeed, as 
shown in Table 8, the legislative grand committee stages 
have so far been almost entirely perfunctory. Most have lasted 
around two minutes, and have been almost invisible within the 
legislative process. During the first year of operation, only two 
bills had legislative grand committee stages that lasted for 
any significant length of time – specifically 43 minutes on the 
Housing and Planning Bill, and 14 minutes on the Charities 
(Protection and Social Investment) Bill. In both cases, much of 
the time taken was by MPs from outside England questioning 
aspects of the new procedures.52 And, while in principle the 
consent votes could have formed part of the expression 
of England’s voice, there has not as yet been a division in 
the legislative grand committee stages. Any hope that this 
mechanism might have added a sense of English voice to 
parliament has therefore been confounded.
50 David Williamson, ‘Politicians are furious at claims senior Tories are briefing Stephen Crabb can’t become PM because he’s a Welsh MP’, WalesOnline, 5 July 
2016, http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/politicians-furious-claims-senior-tories-11566969 [accessed on 29 September 2016].
51 ‘Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister’, 19 September 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
scottish-independence-referendum-statement-by-the-prime-minister [accessed on 29 September 2016].
52 As explained in chapter 2, although only MPs from the relevant territory are members of the committee and may vote, all UK MPs are entitled to speak.
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E S W NI UK
Housing and Planning Bill 2 (EW, E) 43 13 3 1 1 18
Childcare Bill 1 (E) 2 0 0 0 0 0
Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill 1 (EW) 14 3 0 0 1 4
Energy Bill 1 (EW) 2 0 0 0 0 0
Enterprise Bill 2 (EW, E) 4 0 0 0 0 0
Policing and Crime Bill 2 (EW, E) 4 0 0 0 0 0
Finance (No. 2) Bill 1 (EWNI) 2 0 0 0 0 0
Key: E (England), S (Scotland), W (Wales), NI (Northern Ireland), UK (United Kingdom), EW (England and Wales), EWNI (England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland), LGC (legislative grand committee). 
Notes: Length of time calculated from time Deputy Speaker took chair until start of third reading. Where more than one legislative grand 
committee, length is therefore for all added together. Participants are the number of unique MPs who spoke in the legislative grand 
committee on that bill, excluding the committee chair and any interventions to move the consent motion or to raise a point of order.  
Data covers period from 23 October 2015 to 22 October 2016.
One further potential opportunity for engendering a more 
visible English dimension for relevant legislation has also 
had a rather minimal impact. The government’s decision to 
implement a specially constituted committee stage for bills 
whose every clause is certified as relating exclusively to 
England appears to have the potential to offer a significant 
opportunity for English scrutiny and deliberation. But there are 
in practice likely to be very few such bills, and there were none 
during EVEL’s first year in operation.53 Specially constituted 
committee stages therefore appear to provide limited 
opportunities for the expression of an English voice within the 
UK parliament.
It may be that the desire to rectify the West Lothian anomaly 
– associated particularly with the controversial votes that 
occurred under Blair’s second term in office, which we 
discussed in chapter 1 – has weighed particularly heavily 
on the architects of the new system, and as a result the 
achievement of voice has been much less prominent in their 
thinking. Yet these votes were highly unusual, and seem likely 
to remain very rare unless the party balance in the Commons 
changes quite significantly. If the ambition underpinning EVEL 
is to respond to growing popular pressure among the English, 
it may well be that mechanisms for voice have a much greater 
prospect of demonstrating to people in England that their 
interests are being considered within the legislative system.
Parliaments and legislatures perform many different 
functions, only some of which concern voting on legislation. 
Indeed, during the 2015-16 session less than a third of time 
on the floor of the Commons was spent on government 
bills, private members’ bills or secondary legislation. Other 
important types of business included opposition day debates 
(which allow opposition parties to trigger debate on issues 
of their choosing), backbench business debates (which 
allow backbenchers to select the topics debated), and 
oral questions to ministers. In addition to the 1215 hours of 
proceedings in the Commons chamber, around 460 hours 
were spent on similar types of debate in Westminster Hall, 
and almost 1500 Early Day Motions were tabled by MPs to 
highlight particular issues. Commons select committees held 
over 1250 formal meetings, and published 226 reports (House 
of Commons 2016). All of these offer important opportunities 
for scrutiny, deliberation, the airing of new issues, and the 
reflection of public concerns, and can be considered as 
opportunities for the exercise of voice.
The independent McKay Commission (2013:49) concluded 
that England’s ‘voice should be capable of being as 
clearly expressed at Westminster as is the voice of those 
representing other parts of the UK in the devolved legislatures 
on devolved matters’. It is worth noting that the devolved 
legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do not 
only consider legislation, but also conduct debates that 
allow for deliberation and the expression of a collective 
voice for those parts of the UK. It is of course the case that 
English representatives are not prohibited from expressing 
such a voice within the existing mechanisms of Westminster 
business. Indeed, debates in the Commons are mostly 
dominated by English MPs, and those on policy areas 
that have been devolved elsewhere, such as health and 
education, are de facto England-only. But such mechanisms 
are not badged, or even explicitly acknowledged, as being 
about England, and consequently they lack salience as 
spaces for debate about England’s interests. As the McKay 
Commission (2013:47) put it, ‘English concerns need an 
opportunity to be expressed in their own right, rather than 
under the guise of UK-wide matters’. The provision of some 
kind of visibility and separate deliberative opportunity for 
English concerns would represent a valuable opportunity to 
improve English representation at Westminster.
In its current form, EVEL does not give adequate opportunity 
for the expression of England’s voice. We would suggest that 
this lack is a significant deficiency, and in chapter 4 we offer 
some specific proposals for addressing it.
53   It is possible that the forthcoming Local Jobs and Growth Bill will meet the criteria.
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Complexity of EVEL
The final complaint we highlight is the claim that the EVEL 
procedures are unduly complicated. This objection has been 
very widely expressed, and has been directed towards both 
the EVEL processes themselves and the standing orders that 
underpin them. In the Commons debates, for instance, the 
reform was variously described as a ‘total dog’s breakfast’,54 
‘unbelievably obscure’,55 and ‘incomprehensible to most 
Members of this House let alone the wider public’.56
The primary cause of EVEL’s complexity is the substantive 
design of the new processes – in other words, the new 
legislative stages it introduces. This is largely a product of 
the government’s ambition to provide a robust and watertight 
form of veto right for English representatives. The complexity 
of EVEL was illustrated in Figure 2 (in chapter 2), which 
provided a diagrammatic representation of the process on 
primary legislation. To ensure that English (or English and 
Welsh) MPs have the opportunity to consent to the final form 
of legislation as passed by the Commons, EVEL implements 
veto points prior to third reading (implemented through 
the legislative grand committees) and at each CCLA stage 
(via double or triple majority voting). In order to reconcile 
disagreements between the legislative grand committees 
and the whole House, and to ensure that any technical 
inconsistencies can be corrected, two additional stages have 
been added, known as ‘reconsideration’ and ‘consequential 
consideration’. In fact, Figure 2 actually understates EVEL’s 
potential complexity, because each legislative grand 
committee box can comprise up to three separate legislative 
grand committees, each constituted by different (overlapping) 
territorial groups of MPs. As the Commons Procedure 
Committee’s (2015a) interim report pointed out, this potentially 
adds up to eight additional stages during a bill’s Commons 
passage.
For this process to function, the Speaker is required to 
conduct certification on multiple occasions, and this is a 
further source of complexity. Almost every government-
sponsored bill, regardless of whether any provisions are 
ultimately certified, must usually be considered by the 
Speaker at least twice (and potentially three times) during 
its initial Commons passage, as shown in Figure 2. At each 
CCLA stage, the Speaker must also consider Commons 
motions for certification, and this can recur repeatedly given 
that there is no limit to the number of times a bill can ‘ping 
pong’ between the two chambers. In addition, the Speaker 
must consider various other types of business, including 
secondary legislation. Moreover, the desire to provide 
for a robust veto right has necessitated a fairly definitive 
certification test – and, as outlined above, the specific nature 
of the test that has been introduced is itself a potential source 
of legal complexity. It is notable that, for a similar exercise at 
the Scottish Parliament, legal experts are allotted three weeks 
to complete their analysis of a bill.57 All of this potentially adds 
up to an exceptionally demanding process for determining 
whether a particular provision should be certified.
In addition to these substantive procedural effects, the 
standing orders that underpin the new processes have been 
criticised for their complexity and opacity. In their evidence to 
the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(2015:19, 36), two former Clerks of the House of Commons 
– the most senior procedural authority in that chamber – 
confirmed this complaint. Sir William McKay confessed that 
he had ‘great difficulty in discovering what each of these 
Standing Orders that the Government proposed means’, while 
Lord Lisvane suggested that the standing orders showed 
evidence of ‘over-specification’. Among our interviewees, we 
frequently heard the concern that the quasi-legal drafting 
of the EVEL standing orders was out of keeping with the 
existing standing orders, which tend to be less specific and 
give greater discretion to the Speaker. As an indication of 
this complexity, Standing Orders Nos. 83J-83X (which form 
the bulk of the EVEL provisions) run to almost 30 pages. This 
represents around 13% of the total standing orders on public 
business, and exceeds the length of the basic procedures for 
public bills.58 In places the EVEL standing orders are close 
to being impenetrable, most notably those concerning the 
‘reconsideration’ stage and on Finance Bills, both of which 
take the form of a series of amendments to earlier standing 
orders, and in relation to the CCLA stages.
It might be countered that the complexity of the system 
has as yet not mattered much in practical terms. Although 
EVEL can theoretically add up to eight additional stages 
to the initial passage of a bill, this is an unlikely eventuality 
(indeed it can only occur on a Finance Bill) and, during the 
first year of EVEL’s operation, the largest number of further 
stages was two. The new legislative grand committee stages, 
while modestly disruptive, have not during this period put 
an intolerable strain on Commons business or curtailed the 
opportunity for debate at other stages. Indeed, according 
to analysis by Louise Thompson, bills that had provisions 
certified under EVEL in fact received greater time for scrutiny 
at report and third reading stages than those that did not; 
whether this will continue to be the case remains to be 
seen.59 Nevertheless, EVEL certainly has the potential to be 
more disruptive in future, and in certain circumstances the 
complexity of the certification process might be expected 
to have a knock-on consequence for Commons business. 
For example, to reduce disruption caused by the legislative 
grand committee stages, the Speaker has developed the 
practice of issuing a ‘provisional certificate’ in advance, based 
on the assumption that only government amendments will 
pass at report stage. This has so far allowed a swift transition 
to third reading. But were other amendments to be passed 
54   Alex Salmond, HC Deb 15 July 2015, column 967.
55   William Cash, HC Deb 22 October 2015, column 1218.
56   Chris Bryant, HC Deb 22 October 2015, column 1186.
57   Letter and memorandum from the Solicitor of the Scottish Parliament to the Chair of the Commons Procedure Committee, 26 August 2015,  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/procedure/Letter-to-the-Chair-and-memorandum-from-the-Solicitor-to-the-Scottish-Parliament-
on-EVEL.pdf [accessed on 29 September 2016]. Similar documents from the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly are also available 
on the Commons Procedure Committee’s website.
58   Standing Orders Nos. 57-83, which in February 2016 ran to just over 16 pages.
59   Louise Thompson, written evidence to the Commons Procedure Committee, April 2016, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/procedure-committee/english-votes-for-english-laws-standing-orders/written/31860.pdf [accessed on 6 October 2016].
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unexpectedly at report, the Speaker would be required to 
reconsider the certificate, and this could take some time. 
A similar risk of disruption could potentially arise at the 
CCLA stages were a bill to ‘ping pong’ rapidly between the 
two Houses, especially towards the end of a parliamentary 
session.
More substantively, the highly opaque and complex character 
of this system could serve to undermine EVEL’s capacity 
to achieve its more foundational goals. As we have already 
indicated, the complexity of the process has elicited extensive 
comment, and may well be one source of the scheme’s failure 
to acquire legitimacy. Even more worryingly, complexity 
could be a significant obstacle to the goal of ensuring that 
EVEL offers the English a sense of reassurance about, and 
connection with, the Westminster parliament. It may also 
run counter to wider attempts to make the proceedings of 
parliament more accessible to the public (Digital Democracy 
Commission 2015). This is a particular problem if EVEL is 
conceived of as a pragmatic response to pressure, rather 
than being driven by the need for absolute procedural 
symmetry, as discussed above. As the report of the McKay 
Commission (2013:45) put it, ‘[i]f political expectations in 
England are to be met, then any new procedures should 
be simple and comprehensible, not lost in the labyrinth of 
opaque Westminster arrangements’. It is difficult to argue 
that this challenge has been met by the current system. The 
opacity of this new process is not just an aesthetic issue. It 
would matter considerably should a political crisis be sparked 
by an important issue which divided MPs along territorial 
lines. Under such circumstances, it is essential that both MPs 
and the public are broadly able to understand the processes 
that are being employed, and regard them, in general terms, 
as legitimate.
In this chapter, we have discussed EVEL in rather broad 
terms. This leads us to the conclusion that the specific design 
of the system – in particular the double veto – has served to 
offset some, although by no means all, of the major concerns 
about it. Our analysis is to some extent provisional, in that it is 
not possible given the current composition of the Commons 
to assess the workings of this new system in the context of the 
more challenging scenario presented by a UK government 
that lacked a majority in England. We have also identified 
several concrete flaws with the current system, notably its 
failure to facilitate expression to England’s voice and its 
complexity, and have pointed out the problems which have 
reduced the sense of its legitimacy. In addition, despite being 
the main bulwark of the new procedures, the double veto is 
not, as we will see, consistently built into every aspect of this 
system’s design. With these general observations in mind, we 
now turn to consider how the current design of EVEL might be 
improved upon.
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4. Improving EVEL
In the previous chapter we argued that, although in broad terms many of the common criticisms 
of EVEL are not as convincing as they may first appear, the scheme introduced by the 
government nevertheless suffers from a number of flaws. In this chapter we make a series of 
proposals that are intended to mitigate these and improve the working of the current system.
One of the central conclusions of the previous chapter was 
that, although EVEL provides a veto right for English (and 
English and Welsh) MPs, it is far less effective at providing 
England with a voice at Westminster. We therefore begin by 
considering ways of addressing this deficit. In the second 
section we turn to the double veto, which we have argued 
is foundational to the new standing orders and helps them 
withstand some of the common criticisms made of EVEL. Yet 
we also show that certain elements of the new procedures are 
in fact inconsistent with the double veto principle, and, unless 
these are addressed, may well serve to undermine the case 
for this reform. The third section considers the complexity of 
the new procedures, and outlines five different ways in which 
they might be made simpler and less opaque. In the final 
section we consider additional measures that are intended to 
enhance the legitimacy of this new system.
Separating voice and veto
In the previous chapter we drew attention to the difficulty 
of achieving the goals of voice and veto through a single 
institutional reform. We have also argued that the new 
procedures introduced by the government have not proved 
effective in relation to the idea of voice. But, if one of the 
aims of this reform is to give greater confidence to the 
people of England that their interests are being considered in 
parliament, achieving a clearer sense of voice is essential.
In principle England’s voice could be better expressed 
within the legislative process itself. For example, as already 
indicated, the McKay Commission’s (2013) proposal that 
‘grand committee’ debates on whether to ‘consent’ to 
legislation be held prior to second reading – rather than after 
report stage as in the government’s scheme – may have 
provided greater incentive for substantive debate than under 
the current system. However, to retain the government’s 
objective of a formal veto right, this debate would need to 
occur in addition to the existing legislative grand committee 
stages, and this would most likely make EVEL even more 
complex than it already is. Similarly, the specially-constituted 
Commons committee stage could be applied to England 
and Wales-only bills, in addition to England-only bills as at 
present. Yet this is likely to be used rarely (in the first year of 
operation it would have applied to only one bill), and would 
similarly accentuate the complexity of the system.
A less cumbersome way of improving England’s voice 
on legislative scrutiny would be to implement the McKay 
Commission’s recommendation for a selection of bills to be 
subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by committees comprising 
only English (or English and Welsh) MPs. This would take place 
before the formal legislative process began, though would 
feed into it. Such a move would be relatively straightforward 
to implement, and is unlikely to prove particularly contentious 
given that the recommendations of such committees would be 
purely advisory. A forum such as this is far more likely than the 
existing legislative grand committees to result in substantive 
contributions, and there is even a possibility that some of 
the issues and debates aired may capture the interest of the 
media and the public. There is a strong case for experimenting 
with such processes. But, as acknowledged by the McKay 
Commission itself, this mechanism could only reasonably be 
applied to a fraction of government legislation.
So while it might in principle be possible to amplify England’s 
(or England’s and Wales’) voice within the legislative process, 
none of the solutions that are to hand appear ideal. There is a 
danger that some of them, if combined with the existing veto, 
might make this new system even more complex. It would, 
in our view, be preferable to accept that EVEL is primarily 
designed to achieve some form of veto, and that voice should 
be facilitated through alternative mechanisms. As we have 
observed, legislatures fulfil a variety of functions, in addition 
to debating and approving legislation, and it is in relation to 
some of these important, additional roles that opportunities 
for an English voice might be most readily achieved.
Below, we therefore consider briefly the merits of two 
specific mechanisms – an English grand committee, and 
an English Affairs select committee. On balance, the latter 
appears to us the most attractive of these options, although 
both could in principle be introduced together. The case for, 
and detailed design of, these and other mechanisms should 
be considered by a cross-party body such as the Commons 
Procedure Committee.
An English grand committee
One potential institutional innovation worth considering is an 
English grand committee. The House of Commons already 
has a well established set of territorial grand committee 
arrangements for representing the three non-English parts 
of the UK. The addition of an English body would constitute 
an incremental step within the evolution of parliamentary 
government, rather than an alien implantation, and has the 
added virtue of providing for England an equivalent to bodies 
that already exist in parliament for other parts of the UK.
The system of territorial grand committees has existed for 
over a century. The first of these to be established was the 
Scottish grand committee in 1907, followed by those for 
Wales in 1960, and Northern Ireland in 1996 (Birrell 2007; 
Russell and Lodge 2006). Since their establishment, the 
formal powers of these bodies have been revised on multiple 
occasions, and continue to vary between the three. One of 
their key roles has been to scrutinise legislation that applied 
to the relevant part of the UK. Indeed, they appear to have 
provided inspiration for the McKay Commission’s separate 
‘English grand committee’ innovation within the legislative 
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process, which has in turn been converted by the government 
into the legislative grand committee stage. But the existing 
territorial grand committees have also had wider remits, 
including the capacity to question ministers, conduct short 
debates and receive ministerial statements. Following the 
implementation of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in the late 1990s, the roles performed by these bodies 
largely passed to the devolved legislatures, and the Scottish 
grand committee has not met since 2003. Nevertheless, 
arrangements for all of them remain in the Commons standing 
orders, and some are still occasionally convened. The 
Northern Ireland grand committee met in September 2013 
to question ministers and conduct a debate on ‘peace and 
progress’ in Northern Ireland, and more recently the Welsh 
grand committee met in February 2016 to debate the Draft 
Wales Bill.
This system has as yet not been applied to England as 
a whole, though it has been developed for its regions. A 
standing committee on regional affairs was established and 
met for a short period in the late 1970s, before falling into 
disuse, and then being resurrected by Labour in 2000. In 
response to a report from the Modernisation Committee in 
2008, this committee was later temporarily replaced under 
Gordon Brown’s government with eight regional grand 
committees (Modernisation Committee 2008). These each 
met only once in 2009; arrangements for them expired at the 
end of the 2005-10 parliament and the incoming coalition 
government in 2010 chose not to re-establish them. Applying 
similar arrangements on an England-wide basis would 
therefore represent a continuation with previous territorial 
arrangements in the House of Commons.
Careful consideration would need to be given to the remit and 
membership of such a body. Arrangements for the existing 
grand committees differ on the question of membership 
eligibility. The Scottish grand committee comprises all 
MPs representing Scottish constituencies, whereas the 
Northern Ireland and Welsh grand committees each include 
some additional members.60 But in the case of an English 
grand committee, the most difficult question would not 
be whether to include additional members, but whether it 
should comprise all those sitting for English constituencies 
or only a representative subset. And the question of its size 
is connected to the issue of where it might meet. Were it to 
comprise all English MPs, it would perhaps have to be held 
in the main Commons chamber, and there is a risk that this 
would then look, in symbolic terms, like an English parliament 
in all but name – but one incubated within the UK’s national 
legislature. If its membership were restricted, criteria for 
selection of members and party balance would need to 
be devised. However, the expected renovation works on 
the Palace of Westminster may well present an opportunity 
to overcome any problems created by the constraints 
associated with the physical layout of the building.
An English Affairs select committee
A more promising way of boosting a sense of English voice 
at Westminster comes from the establishment an English 
Affairs select committee. The House of Commons has a 
longstanding network of such bodies. The current system of 
departmental select committees was established in 1979, 
but the origins of the mechanism date back much further. As 
with the grand committee proposal, there is every chance 
that introducing an English Affairs select committee would 
therefore be seen as an incremental evolution rather than 
an innovation introduced from outside the parameters of the 
existing system.
At present, the Commons is home to Scottish Affairs, Welsh 
Affairs, and Northern Ireland Affairs select committees. 
These are departmental select committees, meaning that 
their remit is ‘to examine the expenditure, administration 
and policy of the principal government departments’ – in 
these cases the Scotland Office, the Wales Office, and the 
Northern Ireland Office respectively.61 In reality, however, 
they have tended to interpret their roles more broadly, and 
they have conducted inquiries, collected evidence and 
made recommendations on a wide range of non-devolved or 
reserved matters of particular interest to the relevant part of 
the UK.62 In the current parliament, for example, the Scottish 
Affairs Committee has conducted inquiries on the implications 
of the EU referendum for Scotland, the post-study work visa 
scheme, and Scotland’s creative industries – all of which 
also fall within the remits of committees scrutinising other 
government departments. The innovative element here is that 
the select committee model has not previously been applied 
to England as a whole; the Commons did experiment with 
regional select committees within England alongside the 
regional grand committees mentioned above, and they were 
similarly disbanded.
But extending the select committee model on an all-England 
basis does present particular challenges that would need 
careful consideration. Such a body might be harder to fit into 
the existing architecture of parliamentary scrutiny. There is 
no UK government department specifically responsible for 
English affairs, and so this could not be a select committee 
shadowing a particular department. It would, therefore, 
need a different, and more explicitly cross-cutting, remit, 
a characteristic that already applies to non-departmental 
committees. But such committees present a risk of 
duplication, and this would be particularly acute for an English 
Affairs committee, for two reasons. First, on non-devolved 
matters, England is a much larger part of the UK ‘whole’ than 
are other parts of the UK, and so it is by definition harder to 
define English concerns in very precise terms. And second, 
on matters devolved elsewhere, other select committees 
will already have responsibility for scrutiny of de facto 
England-only policy, whether for whole departments focused 
almost entirely on England (e.g. the Health and Education 
select committees) or individual policy portfolios held by 
departments with a wider remit (e.g. English regional policy by 
the Communities and Local Government Committee).
60   The relevant standing orders also provide for ministers to participate if they are not committee members, although they may not vote.
61   Commons Standing Order No. 152(1).
62   The Welsh Affairs Committee, for example, states that its ‘terms of reference are to examine matters within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Wales 
(including relations with the National Assembly for Wales). In practice, the Committee examines policies of the UK Government which have an impact in Wales 
(for example strategic transport, welfare and defence)’. See: ‘Role - Welsh Affairs Committee’, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/
commons-select/welsh-affairs-committee/role/ [accessed on 27 October 2016].
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Even so, the potential for duplication and overlapping remits 
are not insurmountable challenges, and could be resolved 
through pro-active coordination between the committees. 
One way around the dilemma might be for it to be tasked 
specifically with considering issues and trends that fall across 
departmental lines – for instance the impact of migration upon 
public services, or learning and skills gaps in different parts 
of England. It might also take on the role of reviewing, and 
drawing to the attention of the House, legislative proposals 
from across government that may be of particular interest to 
England – or even of triggering the EVEL process on specific 
bills (as further discussed below). The role of examining and 
reporting on legislation is not dissimilar to the current practices 
of the European Scrutiny Committee, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, the Constitution Committee, and the Delegated 
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee; it might also be 
regarded as similar to the role performed by committees 
of the Scottish Parliament in considering and reporting on 
legislative consent memorandums.63 Although fairly modest 
in scope, such a function might conceivably contribute 
powerfully to the aim of showing that England’s interests are 
being voiced and heard at Westminster. In terms of its putative 
membership, there is a debate to be had about whether the 
normal convention that its party balance should reflect the 
House as a whole – as opposed to in England alone – would 
be appropriate in this instance.
It would be perfectly possible to envisage an English grand 
committee and an English Affairs select committee working 
alongside each other, and informing each other’s work. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the experiment with English 
regional grand committees and select committees in 2008-
10 was presented as a single package. The report of the 
Modernisation Committee (2008:19), which led to those 
reforms, argued that ‘[s]elect committees provide a focus and 
a consistency of effort that would not be present if regional 
accountability were purely dealt with in grand committees, 
which are primarily forums for debate’, but it observed too that 
grand committees nevertheless allow participation beyond 
the narrow membership of a select committee. A similar 
justification might well apply to the establishment of new all-
England bodies.
Entrenching the double veto
We have argued in previous chapters that the double veto 
helps to protect EVEL against several criticisms commonly 
made against this type of reform, including the charge that 
it has created two classes of MP and that it prevents MPs 
from outside England from properly defending the interests 
of their constituents. The retention of full veto rights for the 
UK-wide House should be seen as a bedrock principle of the 
union parliament. The double veto represents the best basis 
for introducing a veto right for English representatives without 
fundamentally undermining the ethos of the Westminster 
parliament.
However, certain types of business appear to not be 
well-suited to the double veto. In the previous chapter we 
highlighted Gallagher’s (2015) observation that the application 
of EVEL on legislation that must regularly be reapproved 
by parliament – on taxation and certain forms of secondary 
legislation – could enable a subset of MPs to hold the UK 
government to ransom. This objection warrants careful 
consideration by the government. Possible solutions might 
be to devise some mechanism by which the application of a 
veto results in the maintenance of the status quo rather than 
the existing legislation lapsing, or alternatively for the EVEL 
procedures to no longer apply to such forms of legislation.
In addition, there are two aspects of the current EVEL 
procedures that depart from the double veto. These relate 
to the consideration of instruments subject to the negative 
procedure, and certain scenarios during the consideration 
of Lords messages at the CCLA stages. Should the double 
veto be circumvented in practice, there is a serious risk that 
the very principle of the reform, and its impact on UK-wide 
representation, may be called into question.
To understand these departures from the double veto, it is 
important to emphasise what this term actually means – and, 
specifically, what it represents a veto over. Its introduction 
means that two groups of MPs – English (or English and 
Welsh) and UK-wide – have the ability to veto proposed text 
from being passed into law. If either group of MPs votes 
against the proposed wording of legislation at specific points 
in the process, that text cannot become law.
The first apparent departure from this principle in the EVEL 
standing orders concerns instruments (usually secondary 
legislation) that are subject to the negative procedure. 
Unlike those subject to the affirmative procedure (which are 
considered on a motion that the instrument be approved), 
those subject to the negative procedure are considered on 
a motion that the instrument be annulled (meaning that it will 
remain, or become, law unless parliament actively rejects 
it). Under EVEL, it is this motion that is subject to the double 
majority voting procedure, meaning that the instrument will 
come into, or remain in, force unless both groups of MPs 
vote to annul it. In effect, the double veto principle is here 
applied not to the legislative text, but to a motion to delete the 
legislative text. As a consequence, the new system creates 
the possibility that English representatives may be unable to 
block such legislation in future due to the votes of the whole 
House (or vice versa). For this reason, we regard procedure 
here as inconsistent with the double veto principle.
Procedure on negative instruments is admittedly a highly 
technical matter. The negative procedure is usually applied on 
instruments considered to be less controversial, and it is rare for 
any statutory instrument to be rejected by the Commons: Fox 
and Blackwell (2014) found just 11 cases between 1950-2014, 
of which six were subject to the negative procedure. But their 
significance should not be entirely understated, particularly if 
part of the purpose of EVEL is to signal that England’s interests 
are being heard at Westminster. Unlike instruments subject to 
the affirmative procedure, negative instruments are not routinely 
presented for a formal decision: they are usually only debated if 
this is requested by the opposition, and votes on them are even 
rarer. If such a division did take place, therefore, it might suggest 
a degree of salience.
During the first year of EVEL’s operation, only one such vote 
was held: on the Education (Student Support) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2015. This was almost certainly the most 
contentious division on which EVEL applied over this period, 
and indeed was the only piece of legislation on which the 
Commons authorities received representations from outside 
63   See the standing orders of the Scottish Parliament, chapter 9B.
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parliament on certification.64 If English MPs had voted to 
annul the statutory instrument but UK MPs had not, so that 
it remained in force against the wishes of English MPs, this 
would have put into question whether English MPs truly have 
a veto right on certified legislation. If UK MPs had voted to 
annul the statutory instrument but English MPs had not, 
so that it remained in force against the wishes of UK MPs, 
it would have undermined the government’s claim to have 
protected the position of the UK-wide House. To correct 
this, we would suggest, the EVEL standing orders should be 
amended so that, in the case of instruments subject to the 
negative procedure, the instrument is annulled if a majority of 
either group of MPs votes in support the motion to annul it.
An important caveat here is that, were this change to be 
made, it would mean that English (or English and Welsh) 
MPs would gain the ability to veto instruments subject to 
the negative procedure. As such, the problem identified 
by Gallagher (discussed above) – concerning secondary 
legislation that must be regularly reapproved by parliament 
– might become salient in relation to instruments subject to 
the negative procedure. We therefore recommend that the 
change applying the double veto to the negative procedure 
be made in conjunction with an effort to correct the problem 
identified by Gallagher.
The second departure from the double veto principle 
relates to Lords amendments at the CCLA stages. As 
explained in chapter 2, any Commons motion relating to 
Lords amendments is subject to double majority voting, 
and requires the support of both English (and/or English 
and Welsh) and UK-wide MPs for the Lords amendment(s) 
to be agreed to. Lords amendments may seek to add text 
to a bill, in which case double majority voting is consistent 
with the double veto principle. However, Lords amendments 
may alternatively delete text from the bill. In this case, and 
in common with negative statutory instruments, this means 
that the double veto here applies not to the draft legislative 
text, but to a proposal to delete text from the bill. As such, 
legislative text could be retained even if one of the two groups 
of MPs wished to prevent it from becoming law.
It might be countered that this situation can only arise once 
such text has already been approved by MPs during the bill’s 
initial passage through the Commons, and therefore that it is 
reasonable for the double veto to not be applied to the bill’s 
text at these later stages. However, this is to misunderstand 
the bicameral nature of the Westminster legislative process. 
Parliament’s scrutiny of primary legislation brings together 
both chambers, and within it the House of Lords performs 
an important and well-established constitutional role in 
highlighting particular issues and asking the Commons to 
‘think again’. As Meg Russell (2013) has demonstrated, the 
relationship between the two chambers is not a zero sum 
game: in performing its role the Lords often serves to enhance 
the bargaining power of MPs, and in particular government 
backbenchers, in securing policy change. Indeed, MPs will 
often not have previously voted on the specific provision 
objected to by the Lords. To assume that the Commons’ initial 
assent to a bill is the end of the matter is therefore a mistake: 
the right of MPs to reconsider following any subsequent 
consideration by peers is an important and valuable part of 
the scrutiny process. We therefore regard it as problematic for 
the double veto to apply in its current form to Lords proposals 
that delete text from a bill.
The double veto principle would seem to imply that motions 
at CCLA that propose additions to the bill should require the 
support of both groups of MPs, whereas those proposing 
deletions from the bill should require the support of only 
one. In practice, however, such a solution is likely to prove 
highly challenging, and perhaps unworkable. A single motion 
relating to Lords amendments may make multiple changes, 
some of which add text and others which delete it; indeed, 
a single Lords amendment may make both additions and 
deletions, for example where substituting text. Yet the double 
veto is central to the government’s reform, and so the failure 
to reflect it at these later stages is a serious flaw. Unless a 
satisfactory solution can be found, it may well be preferable 
to accept that the EVEL veto cannot be applied to motions at 
CCLA without undermining Westminster’s status as a UK-wide 
legislature. If this is the conclusion reached, there is a case for 
no longer applying EVEL at the CCLA stages, a suggestion to 
which we return below.
Reducing complexity
During the course of our research, we have repeatedly heard 
the concern that the new procedures are too complex and 
burdensome for their primary users – MPs – with some 
stakeholders describing them to us as incomprehensible. 
Given that one of the key reasons for introducing EVEL 
was to renew the confidence of the English public in 
the UK parliament, there is good reason to think that 
reforming the current system to ensure greater visibility 
and comprehensibility is imperative. Achieving this goal is 
congruent with giving more emphasis to voice.
In this section we present a menu of options for reducing 
the complexity of the system. These are divided into five 
categories. Two seek to avoid the new procedures being 
triggered unnecessarily: by activating EVEL only on specific 
bills; and by reducing the need to formally convene the 
legislative grand committee stages. Two further proposals 
are designed to reduce the complexity of the stages and 
mechanisms themselves: by providing fewer veto points 
during the process; and by certifying fewer types of provision. 
The final option is to reduce the complexity of the standing 
orders that underpin the new processes. In proposing this 
menu of options, we seek to present a range of possible 
solutions to the problem of complexity, from which others can 
select. Some of the options do have potential downsides, 
and these are identified in our discussion.
Activating EVEL on fewer bills
One option for reducing the complexity of EVEL is to activate 
the process only on specific bills where there is a demand for 
EVEL stages and votes. At present, the Speaker is required 
to consider for certification almost all government-sponsored 
bills that come before the Commons. If any provision is 
certified, those parts of the bill are automatically subject to 
the revised EVEL legislative process, including the legislative 
grand committee stages.
64   This was from the presidents of the National Union of Students, NUS Scotland, NUS Wales and NUS-USI. See the Commons Public Bill Office, written evidence 
to the Procedure Committee, 31 August 2016, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/procedure-committee/
english-votes-for-english-laws-standing-orders/written/36694.pdf [accessed on 5 October 2016].
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As already indicated, during their first year of operation 
none of the new EVEL stages have in practice been used 
to debate the implications of the relevant bill on England 
(or England and Wales), and most have been entirely 
perfunctory. Nor has there been any serious attempt by 
English (or English and Welsh) MPs to apply the veto. 
Contrary to the claims of some critics, this does not 
necessarily mean that EVEL serves no purpose. Importantly, 
it provides the right to a veto and the opportunity to exercise 
it. Yet if what matters is the establishment of a new right 
to exercise a veto, it remains far from clear why the entire 
EVEL process should automatically be activated on every 
provision that meets the two-part certification test. A more 
selectively applied veto would be less disruptive, more 
comprehensible and more likely to satisfy a majority of MPs. 
It would, accordingly, be sensible to apply the EVEL process 
only to specific bills where there is clear evidence that MPs 
wish to make use of its mechanisms. This was indeed one 
of the conclusions reached by the Commons Procedure 
Committee (2015a) in its interim report into EVEL.
There are several different mechanisms through which the 
EVEL process could be more selectively activated. The 
solution proposed by the Procedure Committee was for it to 
be achieved through a vote of the House on a motion moved 
by a minister. The weakness of this proposal, however, is that 
it places control entirely in the hands of government (subject 
to approval by the House), which has an abiding interest in the 
passage of its legislation. Ministers are unlikely to activate the 
veto process unless they are confident that English (or English 
and Welsh) MPs will support their legislation.
There are, however, alternative options worthy of consideration. 
Above we suggested the establishment of bodies to facilitate 
England’s voice within the Commons. Such a body could 
be entrusted with the ability to activate the process, whether 
through formal or informal mechanisms – for example, through 
a convention that the process is always activated where the 
English Affairs committee has requested it. In addition, the 
McKay Commission (2013:54) made two further proposals for 
the triggering of a similar process, and these could be adapted 
to the government’s current EVEL reform. The first was for 
activation through a motion tabled by any MP representing a 
constituency in England (or England and Wales), provided it 
attracted a minimum number of signatures from other MPs 
from the area concerned. A second option was for the power 
to table such a motion to be given to the leader of the largest 
opposition party in England (or England and Wales).
Applying EVEL to a selection of bills would have the 
advantage of retaining the right to a veto, but without 
triggering all of the elaborate procedural changes set out in 
the standing orders unless there was a clear political demand 
to make use of them. Once EVEL was activated, the strength 
of the veto could, in principle, remain as robust as at present. 
One limitation, however, is that it may be more challenging 
to envisage how EVEL could be activated on a bill part-
way through its passage, in the event that unexpected and 
contentious new provisions were added.
Avoiding the legislative grand committee stages
A second method of simplifying the EVEL process would 
be to avoid convening the legislative grand committees 
unnecessarily. In common with the first option, this would 
not reduce the complexity of the procedures themselves, but 
would simplify their practical operation in many cases. As 
explained above, all bills with certified provisions must pass 
through one or more legislative grand committee stages. 
These stages have so far provided little obvious benefit, 
yet they invariably require Commons business to be briefly 
suspended and are often incomprehensible to MPs. Under 
this approach, the legislative grand committees would only be 
triggered where there is evidence of some demand for them.
Proposals in this vein have taken two broad forms. The first 
is to determine the need for a legislative grand committee 
based on whether MPs from England (or England and Wales) 
voted differently from the UK-wide House on amendments at 
report stage. In its interim report, the Commons Procedure 
Committee (2015a) recommended that, prior to report stage, 
the Speaker should certify amendments tabled by MPs, and 
that the legislative grand committee stage be triggered only 
where the two groups of MPs arrived at different decisions in 
any vote on a certified amendment. A variant on this proposal 
has been suggested by the Commons Public Bill Office. This 
would involve the Speaker certifying clauses and schedules 
prior to report stage, and the legislative grand committees 
being triggered where a vote on an amendment relating to a 
certified clause or schedule resulted in a split decision.65
We are not fully persuaded by either form of this proposal. 
Certifying amendments prior to report stage has the 
potential to increase the workload of the Speaker quite 
considerably, as he would be required to consider for 
certification every amendment that could potentially be put 
to a division. At present, by contrast, the Speaker issues 
‘provisional certificates’ prior to report stage, but only takes 
into account government-sponsored amendments (which 
in practice are likely to be the only amendments passed by 
MPs). Certifying clauses and schedules avoids this difficulty, 
but also means that, where an amendment changes the 
area of certification, only MPs representing the original 
territorial area would be able to trigger the new stages. 
The government’s response to the Procedure Committee’s 
interim report also highlights some additional challenges 
to this type of solution, including that some mechanism 
would need to be devised for giving consent to amendments 
passed at the earlier committee stage.66
The second proposal for avoiding automatic consideration 
by the legislative grand committees would be for the consent 
motion to be considered, in the first instance, by the UK-
wide House. This proposal was also made by the Commons 
Public Bill Office, and has greater merit than that considered 
above.67 Under this scheme, the legislative consent motion 
– which at present is moved and passed in the legislative 
grand committee – would be moved in the whole House. 
Only if an MP objected to it would it be necessary to trigger 
the legislative grand committee stages; in all other cases, 
the motion would be agreed to, and the bill would pass 
65   Common Public Bill Office, written evidence to the Procedure Committee, 31 August 2016, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/procedure-committee/english-votes-for-english-laws-standing-orders/written/36694.pdf [accessed on 5 October 2016].
66   Chris Grayling, written statement, 20 October 2015, HCWS251.
67   See the Commons Public Bill Committee written evidence to the Procedure Committee, cited above.
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immediately to its third reading. As such, the opportunity 
for a legislative grand committee vote and debate would be 
retained, but these stages would not actually be convened 
unless required, thus minimising disruption.
Fewer veto points
A third way in which the EVEL veto might be simplified 
would be for it to apply at fewer points during the legislative 
process. Unlike the first two options, this would simplify the 
actual processes themselves, rather than merely avoiding 
them being triggered unnecessarily. At present, as set out in 
chapter 2, English (or English and Welsh) MPs may exercise a 
veto towards the end of a bill’s initial Commons passage, and 
then again at each CCLA stage. The Speaker is consequently 
required to consider bills for certification on multiple 
occasions during their passage. During the first year of EVEL’s 
operation, the largest number of veto points on a single bill 
was four, on the Housing and Planning Bill (the initial passage, 
followed by three CCLA stages).
The application of EVEL to the CCLA stages does provide 
a more robust veto right than would otherwise be the case, 
ensuring that English (or English and Welsh) MPs have the 
opportunity to veto any amendments made by the Lords, 
as well as any Commons proposals in response. But it 
achieves this at the cost of greater complexity and reduced 
comprehensibility. Moreover, because procedure at CCLA 
is itself complicated, the standing order that applies EVEL to 
this part of the legislative process is necessarily complicated, 
running to four pages in length. There is a case therefore for 
considering whether a single veto point, implemented at the 
end of a bill’s initial passage through the Commons, might be 
more effective and transparent than the current procedures 
which create the possibility of veto points at various different 
stages of a bill’s life.
We have already noted above that the double veto principle is 
not adequately reflected at CCLA and that, unless this issue 
can be resolved, it may be preferable for EVEL to not apply at 
these stages. The additional complexity these stages bring to 
the process constitutes a further justification for reconsidering 
whether the application of EVEL to the CCLA stages is 
proportionate.
Fewer items for certification
A fourth proposal to achieve simplification would be for the 
Speaker to be required to consider fewer types of provision 
for certification. In common with a reduction in the number of 
veto points, this option would simplify the actual processes 
themselves rather than just limiting their practical effects.
As we explained in chapter 2, on primary legislation the 
Speaker is required to consider for certification agreed 
amendments that change or eliminate an earlier certification 
decision. We are not convinced by this requirement. If this 
duty were removed alongside no longer certifying at CCLA 
(as discussed above), the Speaker would be left with the 
much more straightforward task of certifying only clauses and 
schedules (and, by extension, bills).
The certification of amendments operates in the following 
way. Except at the initial certification prior to second reading, 
the Speaker is required to identify any agreed amendments 
that had the effect of changing or eliminating an earlier 
certification decision. He must certify these amendments as 
relating to the territorial area to which the clause or schedule 
would have been certified, had the amendment not been 
made. So, for example, an amendment to make a previously 
England-only clause apply to the whole UK would be certified 
as relating to England. The Speaker is not required to certify 
any other amendments that have been passed by MPs.
During the first year of EVEL’s operation, the Speaker certified 
amendments to:
a) delete a previously certified clause from the bill, resulting 
in it no longer being certifiable;68
b) apply a previously England-only clause to England and 
Wales;69
c) apply a previously England and Wales-only clause to 
England only;70 and
d) add a reserved provision, or a provision that applies 
beyond the area in question, to a certified clause, resulting 
in it no longer being certified.71
The justification offered by the government for the certification 
of amendments is ‘to prevent the whole House amending the 
bill at Report stage as it relates to England or England and 
Wales without MPs from England or England and Wales having 
the opportunity to consent to, or veto, such changes’ (Cabinet 
Office 2015b:25) – in other words, to prevent the gaming of the 
system. However, as a point of principle it is not entirely clear 
why English (or English and Welsh) MPs should have the right 
to veto proposals that no longer meet the certification test. In 
cases (b)-(d) above, the result is that one territorial subset of 
MPs was asked to consent to a provision being applied to an 
area represented by a different (albeit overlapping) group of 
MPs. But the overarching aim of EVEL should be to prevent 
legislation that applies only to England (or England and Wales) 
from passing into law without the consent of its own democratic 
representatives; the certification of amendments appears 
superfluous to this principle.
The certification of these amendments also gives rise to 
certain unforeseen inconsistencies. Had the government itself 
incorporated the amendments in the original version of the 
bill as introduced, English (or English and Welsh) MPs would 
not have had this power of veto. Nor would they have had this 
right had the Lords passed the amendments before the bill 
reached the Commons. It appears perverse for a territorial 
subset of MPs to have the power to veto amendments made 
by the UK’s elected House, but not identical changes made 
in the Lords or by the government prior to introduction. And 
it is difficult to regard it as a point of democratic principle 
for English MPs to have the right to veto the first type of 
amendment but not the latter two.
It also seems unclear that the ‘gaming’ scenario highlighted 
by the government could be used to avoid an English veto. 
This is because, for such gaming to be achieved, we expect 
68   Omission of clauses 35 and 36 in committee, and amendments 4, 111 and 129 on report (Housing and Planning Bill); and omission of clauses 33 and 34 in 
committee (Enterprise Bill).
69   Amendments 10-18 in committee (Enterprise Bill).
70   Amendments 180-181 and 127-128 in committee (Housing and Planning Bill).
71   Amendment 3 in committee (Childcare Bill); amendment 145 in committee (Policing and Crime Bill); and any motion relating to Lords amendment 22 (Housing 
and Planning Bill).
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that ministers would usually need to support the move – but 
there are in truth easier and more effective mechanisms 
available to ministers to game the system. At present 642 MPs 
are eligible to vote in the whole House, of which 529 represent 
English constituencies.72 Assuming that all MPs participated in 
any vote, 265 would therefore be needed to veto legislation on 
division in the English legislative grand committee. This leaves 
up to 377 UK-wide MPs who might oppose this move, and 
who might potentially be willing to join such a plan to avoid 
the veto. Ministers are expected to be in this latter category: 
EVEL applies only on government bills, and it seems 
improbable that they would vote to withhold consent to their 
own legislation. Those who might oppose the veto therefore 
break down into two groups: around 13073 members of the 
payroll vote; plus a maximum of around 247 other UK-wide 
MPs.74 For there to be a majority of UK-wide MPs in support of 
gaming the system to avoid a veto, and a majority of English 
MPs intent on applying the veto, we therefore anticipate that 
ministers would normally need to vote with the former. But, 
as we have already indicated, ministers have better ways of 
working around the system if this is their goal: they have the 
power to avoid the veto by introducing their legislation with 
any such amendments already incorporated.
Even if the government is persuaded of the need to guard 
against amendments that attempt to avoid certification, 
however, the requirement that the Speaker certifies all 
amendments that change or eliminate an earlier certification 
decision represents a highly convoluted and legalistic 
response. Different mechanisms should therefore be 
considered. One possible solution is for the Speaker to 
be given the discretionary power to certify amendments 
that seem to him to have the primary purpose of avoiding 
certification. An alternative might be for the Speaker to rule as 
‘out of order’, or deem ‘disagreed to’,75 any such amendments.
It is incumbent upon the government to present a more 
compelling case for why certification of such amendments 
is necessary and proportionate. If it cannot do so, this part 
of the procedures should be dispensed with, a decision that 
would result in the simplification of the current procedures.
Simplifying the standing orders
A final option is to reduce the complexity of the standing orders 
themselves. Some of the options set out above for simplifying 
the process would also have the effect of reducing the length of 
the standing orders. For example, were the application of EVEL 
to Lords amendments dispensed with, Standing Order No. 83O 
would no longer be required. Similarly, were amendments that 
change the area of certification no longer certified, provisions 
could be deleted from some of the other standing orders.
Nevertheless, it also seems probable that the standing orders 
could be redrafted to reduce their complicated character more 
generally. One of the most common criticisms we have heard 
during this research is that they are written in too legalistic a 
fashion. At the minimum, Commons clerks should be asked to 
redraft them with the aim of consolidating the existing text and 
eliminating any unnecessary over-specification. The revised 
procedures ought to set out the broad principles of EVEL, and 
only the most essential detail, rather than setting out all the 
terms of, and rules governing, their application.
Improving legitimacy
The general thrust of the proposals considered here – to 
provide more meaningful mechanisms for the expression 
of England’s voice, to entrench the double veto principle 
more consistently, and to move towards a less cumbersome 
and complex veto model – is also pertinent to the challenge 
of enhancing the legitimacy of a set or procedures that is 
currently viewed in starkly partisan terms. While it is unrealistic 
to expect attitudes towards EVEL to change markedly in the 
short term, there are, nevertheless, opportunities for bridges 
to be built to the opposition parties on this issue, and for the 
strongly partisan perception of EVEL to be diminished. 
It is worth noting that at least some of the McKay Commission’s 
proposals for reform were included in the general election 
manifestos of both the Labour party (2015) and the Liberal 
Democrats (2015). Before that election, in late 2014, the Labour 
party publicly signed up to some of the McKay Commission’s 
proposals in an article written by Sadiq Khan (then Shadow 
Justice Secretary) and Hilary Benn (then Shadow Communities 
Secretary).76 But it is worth stressing that areas of agreement 
have tended to coalesce around proposals for greater voice 
rather than veto. This approach has also been apparent in the 
party’s response to the more detailed proposals published 
after the general election. Angela Eagle, when Shadow Leader 
of the Commons, emphasised Labour’s support for the notion 
that ‘English MPs must be heard on matters that relate purely to 
England’, but criticised the government’s proposals for having 
‘created a veto rather than strengthening the English voice’.77 
Her successor, Chris Bryant, likewise argued that ‘England 
needs a distinctive voice in this Parliament’ and that ‘[t]here 
should be a voice, but not a veto’.78
As such, there is good reason to believe that our 
recommendations for giving greater voice to England might 
provide a more stable basis for cross-party agreement. Equally, 
some of the other changes outlined above are designed in part 
to replicate arrangements that are already employed in relation 
to other territories within the UK, and can thus be presented as 
ways of ensuring that England’s position in the union is better 
protected and recognised after devolution – a stance that has 
the potential to attract support from representatives in other 
parties as well as publics across the UK.
One move that may particularly serve to improve the legitimacy 
and viability of the current reform is to reconsider the name 
given to it. The term ‘English Votes for English Laws’ has been 
72   These figures exclude the Speaker, his three deputies, and four Sinn Fein MPs, none of whom vote.
73   This is based on figures from July 2016, and includes parliamentary private secretaries (Maer and Kelly 2016).
74   In reality it is unlikely that turnout would be 100 percent, but the figures nevertheless serve to illustrate our point.
75   The latter would apply to Lords amendments, and is comparable to existing procedure on Lords amendments that engage ‘unwaivable’ financial privilege 
(Russell and Gover 2014). However, such a move would require consultation between the chambers, and would not be necessary were EVEL no longer applied 
at the CCLA stages, as suggested above.
76   Hilary Benn and Sadiq Khan, ‘We need to give English MPs a greater say over English laws’, PoliticsHome, 12 December 2014,  
https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/social-affairs/politics/news/64951/hilary-benn-sadiq-khan-we-need-give-english-mps-greater [accessed on 29 
September 2016].
77   HC Deb 7 July 2015, column 201; 15 July 2015, column 956.
78   HC Deb 22 October 2015, columns 1187, 1192.
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associated with this type of reform for some time. And while 
it does not feature in the standing orders introduced by the 
government, this name – and its associated acronym – has 
stuck, and has been widely used, including in David Cameron’s 
statement after the Scottish referendum, the documents that 
set out the government’s draft proposals (e.g. Cabinet Office 
2015a), and the parliament website. But this name is in key 
respects misleading. EVEL does not implement a separate 
process on which only English MPs may vote, but instead offers 
a veto right. The name creates the impression that certain MPs 
have been entirely excluded from voting on certain legislation, 
and also represents a form of ‘over claiming’ that may store up 
problems for the future. Serious consideration should therefore 
be given to using a different name for these procedures. We 
would recommend ‘English Consent to English Laws’ (ECEL), 
which not only accurately conveys the scope of the reform 
but also emphasises its equivalence to the legislative consent 
motions that already operate for the other three parts of the UK.
A different mechanism might also help the government improve 
perceptions of the new procedures among both MPs and the 
public at large. The idea was floated in the McKay Commission’s 
(2013) report that, prior to voting on any detailed procedural 
changes, the House of Commons should be invited to vote 
on a resolution affirming the  principles underpinning EVEL. 
Indeed, the commission’s report stated that it ‘attach[ed] 
particular importance to the clear acceptance of the principle 
by a consensus across political opinion’ (McKay Commission 
2013:35). Were this proposal expressed in broad terms, applying 
equally to all four parts of the UK, there is a reasonable chance 
that such a principle might attract cross-party support. The 
Cameron government elected in May 2015 proceeded rather 
differently, however, presenting a relatively complex package 
and seeking consent for all of it at once, without offering MPs 
an opportunity to hear and debate the underlying principles at 
stake in the reform. Given the legitimacy issues that still afflict 
these rules, the government may wish to consider the merits 
of pursuing cross-party discussions about these processes, 
and seeking to reconfigure them on the basis of a set of shared 
principles of the kind that McKay identified.
More specifically, further thought should be given to how to 
make the operation and application of EVEL as transparent as 
possible. This applies particularly to the certification process. 
The government has so far experimented with different ways 
of presenting its certification advice, and this process has 
considerably improved transparency. Similarly, the practice of 
the Speaker’s certificates being published online has made 
them easily accessible. But there is still more that could be 
done in this area. In particular, it could be made easier in 
these documents to track advice across the life of a bill, by 
always cross-referencing to the numbering of the clauses and 
schedules in the version of the bill as first published in the 
Commons. On bills that have been certified under the EVEL 
process, the publication of memoranda on the parliament 
website has not always been consistent, with some advice 
published on the relevant bill’s page, some deposited in the 
Commons Library, and advice at particular stages on some 
bills not published at all.79 On bills that have not been certified, 
the government has tended not to publish any additional 
memoranda, though occasionally has done so.80  The 
consistent publication of clear government advice on all bills 
– whether or not expected to be certified – would undoubtedly 
help to improve the transparency of this part of the process.
More substantively, transparency might be improved by the 
Speaker providing explanations of his certification decisions 
where these have been requested. Whether the Speaker should 
provide explanations has long been debated, on a range of 
different issues, with a key source of the reluctance being the 
fear that the Speaker might be drawn into political controversy. 
In the case of EVEL, the Speaker announced that, in line with the 
recommendation of the Procedure Committee, he would ‘not, 
as a rule, […] give reasons for decisions on certification during 
this experimental phase of the new regime’.81 But he did make 
an exception to this on the Housing and Planning Bill, when he 
provided an explanation in response to a question posed by 
Lady Sylvia Hermon.82 Not only did this not attract any political 
controversy, but his explanation helped defuse a perception of 
injustice, and placed on public record an important precedent 
for how the ‘minor and consequential’ criteria within the standing 
orders might be interpreted. Lady Hermon has subsequently 
made clear her view that ‘it should be for the Speaker to give 
reasons in the Chamber’ (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
2016:18). The wider public interest in such explanations – 
particularly on a politically contentious piece of legislation – 
should also not be underestimated. We would recommend that 
the Speaker therefore consider giving explanations where they 
are requested by MPs, provided that his decisions continue to be 
treated as final. An alternative would be for him to publish more 
general guidance, updated as new cases emerge, to illuminate 
precedent on less straightforward certification decisions.
Finally, the review process being conducted by the government 
offers an important opportunity to listen to perspectives and 
experiences from different political quarters, and to learn from 
the operation of EVEL during its first 12 months. But it should 
also be acknowledged that some of the processes included 
in the new standing orders have not yet occurred. Specifically, 
there has not yet been an England-only committee stage, 
an unexpected decision at report stage that changed the 
Speaker’s provisional certification, the withholding of consent 
by a legislative grand committee, or multiple CCLA stages 
on the same day on a bill. Nor has EVEL yet faced the more 
challenging scenario of a UK government that lacks a majority 
in England. The conduct of the government’s review after only 
one year of operation means that there is only a limited amount 
of data available and that the system as a whole has not as yet 
been properly ‘stress tested’. In subsequent sessions, a higher 
number of bills may well place a greater administrative and 
logistical burden on relevant authorities, while new scenarios 
may emerge that unexpectedly call into question aspects of 
the current procedures. There is therefore a strong case for the 
government’s current review to be considered as provisional 
in kind, and for the procedures to be reviewed again by an 
independent body – for example the Commons Procedure 
Committee – both towards the end of the current parliament 
and during future parliaments.
79   For example, on both the Housing and Planning Bill and the Energy Bill, most of the advice was published on the relevant bill’s page on the parliament website, 
but those relating to report stage were available only as deposited papers in the House of Commons Library.
80   For example, government memoranda on certification were published for the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill (2015-16) and the Wales Bill (2016-
17), neither of which had provisions certified.
81   HC Deb 26 October 2015, column 23.
82   HC Deb, 13 January 2016, columns 861-862.
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In the late 1990s, devolved government was returned to 
Northern Ireland, and was introduced for the first time in 
Scotland and Wales. Since then there has been considerable 
concern about the so-called West Lothian Question – the 
anomaly whereby policy matters that have been devolved are 
voted on only by representatives from the relevant constituent 
part the UK, but equivalent matters concerning only England 
may be voted on by MPs from across the UK. Survey data 
suggests growing irritation about England’s constitutional 
position within the UK among its inhabitants, and there is 
clear support for giving English MPs greater say on legislative 
matters that affect England only.
In chapter 3 of the report we considered the main justifications 
for, and objections to, EVEL. We argued that there are broadly 
two kinds of reasoning for it: first, as a pragmatic response 
to new territorial pressures; and second, as a principled 
commitment to procedural equality between the four parts 
of the UK. The government has not been entirely consistent 
in its arguments for the new standing orders, and there has 
been a degree of ‘over claiming’ about EVEL which may 
store up problems for the future. We also considered five 
key objections that have been made about this reform: that it 
will politicise the office of Speaker; will create two classes of 
MP; risks undermine the coherence of UK-wide government; 
has failed to facilitate expression of England’s voice; and 
is unhelpfully complex and opaque. Based on the first 12 
months of EVEL’s operation, we conclude that key features 
of EVEL – in particular the double veto it offers – have 
served to limit the force of some of these objections. But our 
analysis does point to various flaws in the current system, 
notably in relation to its complexity and its failure to provide a 
meaningful expression of English voice.
This led us in chapter 4 to set out a series of proposals 
designed to improve EVEL and its future operation. 
These focus on four key goals: separating voice and veto; 
entrenching the double veto; reducing complexity; and 
improving legitimacy. Our main recommendations are set out 
more fully below.
List of recommendations
Separating voice and veto
• Greater attention should be paid to the challenge of 
finding ways of enhancing England’s voice in the  
UK parliament.
• One option within the legislative process, broadly 
defined, would be to commit to sending certain bills 
to territorially-constituted pre-legislative scrutiny 
committees.
• More substantively, a cross-party body such as the 
Commons Procedure Committee should consider the 
case for, and detailed design of, additional mechanisms 
for facilitating England’s voice. These should include an 
English grand committee and/or an English Affairs select 
committee.
• An English grand committee should have a remit beyond 
scrutiny of legislation, including the capacity to question 
ministers, conduct short debates, and receive ministerial 
statements. Serious consideration should be given to 
how such a body would be composed, and whether it 
is practical for it to comprise all English MPs or only a 
representative subset. Its size is related to the question 
of where it should meet; holding it in the main Commons 
chamber may be undesirable.
• An English Affairs select committee should have a 
cross-cutting remit, in order to reduce the potential for 
duplication with the work of existing select committees. 
It may also be given the role of reviewing, and drawing 
to the attention of the House, legislative proposals from 
across government departments. Consideration should 
be given to whether this committee should reflect the 
party balance in the whole House or in England alone.
Conclusion and recommendations
Within this report we set out to analyse the new ‘English Votes for English Laws’ procedures 
that were adopted by the House of Commons in October 2015. Although they were introduced 
relatively recently, it is important to appreciate that they follow on from more than a century 
of debate about devolution in different parts of the UK, and its implications for territorial 
representation at Westminster. This historical backdrop was set out in chapter 1.
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Entrenching the double veto
• The double veto should be regarded as a bulwark of 
the current system. Any move towards an England-only 
legislative process within the confines of the Westminster 
parliament would render the new procedures vulnerable 
to many of the criticisms commonly made against them.
• The government should eliminate the situation whereby 
legislation that must be regularly reapproved by 
parliament – such as certain taxation and secondary 
legislation – is subject to veto by a subset of MPs.
• The government should correct two elements of the 
system that are not fully congruent with the double veto 
principle:
 – In the case of instruments subject to the negative 
procedure, the standing orders should be amended 
so that such an instrument is annulled if either 
English (or English and Welsh) or UK-wide MPs 
(rather than both as at present) vote in support of the 
motion to annul it.
 – In the case of the anomaly surrounding Lords 
amendments that delete legislative text, the 
government should devise a solution for how the 
double veto principle can be reflected at CCLA. If 
a satisfactory solution cannot be found, it may be 
preferable to accept that EVEL cannot be applied to 
motions at CCLA without undermining Westminster’s 
status as a UK-wide legislature.
Reducing complexity
• The complexity of the current procedures could and 
should be reduced. Options that might be considered 
here include: only activating the new stages and 
processes where required; reducing the complexity of 
the new stages and processes that are possible under 
the rules; and addressing the complexity of the standing 
orders that underpin the new processes.
• There are two main options for triggering the new stages 
and processes only when required.
 – The first is to activate the EVEL process in a more 
discretionary fashion – on specific bills, or clauses. 
The decision to activate the processes should not 
rest solely in the hands of ministers. Other options 
for activation include giving the power to: any new 
body established to give voice to England (as 
discussed above); English (or English and Welsh) 
MPs, with a minimum number of signatures required; 
or the leader of the largest opposition party in 
England (or England and Wales).
 – The second is to avoid convening legislative grand 
committees unless they are required. This could 
be achieved by allowing the consent motion to be 
agreed to in the whole House, provided it attracts no 
objection, and proceeding to the legislative grand 
committees only where an objection is registered.
• Two main options for reducing the complexity of the new 
stages and processes themselves are suggested:
 – The first is to reduce the number of veto points 
on primary legislation. In particular, serious 
consideration should be given to whether it 
is necessary for EVEL to apply at the CCLA 
stages. While such a move might make the veto 
less comprehensive, it would also make it more 
comprehensible and transparent.
 – The second is for certification to apply to fewer types 
of provision. In particular, serious consideration 
should be given to whether it is necessary to certify 
amendments that change or eliminate an earlier 
certification decision.
• The standing orders themselves should be reviewed, 
ideally by Commons clerks, to establish whether they 
could be consolidated and simplified. The revised 
procedures should set out the broad principles of 
EVEL, and only the most essential detail, rather than 
specifying all the terms of their application. Simplification 
of the standing orders would be further facilitated if the 
substantive procedures themselves were made simpler in 
line with the recommendations above.
Improving legitimacy
• If EVEL is to prove durable, it is essential that the 
government takes steps to improve its standing and 
legitimacy in parliament.
• The name currently attached to this reform, ‘English Votes 
for English Laws’, is misleading and potentially divisive. 
We suggest that it be changed to ‘English Consent 
to English Laws’ (ECEL), which would underscore its 
equivalence to the legislative consent motions passed by 
the devolved legislatures.
• The government should consider pursuing cross-
party discussions about these processes, and seek 
to establish agreement on the principles underpinning 
them.
• The government should continue to experiment with ways 
of making its certification advice as clear and accessible 
as possible.
• The Speaker should consider offering publicly accessible 
explanations for his certification decisions where 
these are requested by MPs. Alternatively, he should 
consider publishing more general guidance, updated 
as new cases emerge, to illuminate precedent in less 
straightforward cases.
• The current review being conducted by government 
should be considered as provisional in kind. A body 
independent of government, such as the Commons 
Procedure Committee, should review the operation of 
EVEL before the end of the current parliament, and in 
subsequent parliaments.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Draft Non-Domestic Rating (Levy and Safety Net) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2015 18/11/2015 E Affirmative No
Draft Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code E) Order 2015 18/11/2015 EW Affirmative No
Draft Legal Services Act 2007 (Claims Management Complaints) (Fees) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2016
25/11/2015 EW Affirmative No
Draft Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 (Variation of Schedule 8) (England) Order 2015 09/12/2015 E Affirmative No
Education (Student Support) (Amendment) Regulations 2015 (S.I., 2015, No. 1951) 06/01/2016 E Negative Yes
Draft Infrastructure Planning (Onshore Wind Generating Stations) Order 2016 20/01/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Warrington (Electoral Changes) Order 2016 27/01/2016 E Negative N/A± ±
Draft Greater Manchester Combined Authority (Election of Mayor with Police and Crime 
Commissioner Functions) Order 2016
09/02/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft Tees Valley Combined Authority Order 2016 24/02/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft Crown Court (Recording) Order 2016 11/04/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) (Amendment) 
Order 2016
20/04/2016** EW Affirmative No
Draft Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 20/04/2016** EW Affirmative No
Draft Licensing Act 2003 (Her Majesty the Queen’s Birthday Licensing Hours) Order 2016 20/04/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Pubs Code etc. Regulations 2016 20/04/2016 EW Affirmative N/A±
Draft Pubs Code (Fees, Costs and Financial Penalties) Regulations 2016 20/04/2016 EW Affirmative N/A±
Draft West Midlands Combined Authority Order 2016 03/05/2016** E Affirmative Yes
Draft Access to Justice Act (Destination of Appeals) Order 2016 11/05/2016** EW Affirmative No
School Governance (Constitution and Federations) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 
(S.I., 2016, No. 204)
08/06/2016 E Negative N/A± ±
Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) Order 
2016 (S.I., 2016, No. 332)
08/06/2016 E Negative N/A± ±
Draft Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and 
Wales) Order 2016
08/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Telecommunications Restriction Orders (Custodial Institutions) (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2016
08/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Water and Sewerage Undertakers (Exit from Non-household Retail Market) Regulations 2016 08/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Halton, Knowsley, Liverpool, St Helens, Sefton and Wirral Combined Authority (Election of 
Mayor) Order 2016
15/06/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft Tees Valley Combined Authority (Election of Mayor) Order 2016 29/06/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2016 29/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Pubs Code etc. Regulations 2016* 29/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Pubs Code (Fees, Costs and Financial Penalties) Regulations 2016* 29/06/2016 EW Affirmative No
Draft Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham and Sheffield Combined Authority (Election of Mayor) 
Order 2016
06/07/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft Neighbourhood Planning (Referendums) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 06/07/2016 E Affirmative No
Draft West Midlands Combined Authority (Election of Mayor) Order 2016 06/07/2016 E Affirmative Yes
Draft Durham, Gateshead, Newcastle Upon Tyne, North Tyneside, Northumberland, South 
Tyneside and Sunderland Combined Authority (Election of Mayor) Order 2016
13/07/2016 E Affirmative N/A±
Draft Self-build and Custom Housebuilding (Time for Compliance and Fees) Regulations 2016 20/07/2016 E Affirmative No
Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2016 (S.I., 2016, No. 781) 07/09/2016 EW Affirmative No± ± ±
Other instruments
Police Grant Report (England and Wales) for 2016–17 (HC 753) N/A*** EW Affirmative Yes
Report on Local Government Finance (England) 2016–17 (HC 789) N/A*** E Affirmative Yes
Referendums Relating to Council Tax Increases (Alternative Notional Amounts) (England) Report 
2016/2017
09/02/2016 E Affirmative No
Referendums Relating to Council Tax Increases (Principles) (England) 2016–17 (HC 790) N/A*** E Affirmative No
Budget resolutions
Stamp duty land tax (calculating tax on non-residential and mixed transactions) (45) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
Stamp duty land tax (higher rates for additional dwellings etc.) (46) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
SDLT higher rate (land purchased for commercial use) (47) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
SDLT higher rate (acquisition under home reversion plan) (48) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
SDLT higher rate (properties occupied by certain employees) (49) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
Stamp duty land tax (co-ownership authorized contractual schemes) (50) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
Landfill tax (rates) (57) 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
Motion on Procedure (Future Taxation) relating to rates of landfill tax 21/03/2016 EWNI N/A No
Appendix B: EVEL certification and practice on other business, October 2015-October 2016
Key: E (England), EW (England and Wales), EWNI (England, Wales and Northern Ireland).
* Revised version of previously certified SI.    ** Subsequently re-certified in 2016-17 session.    *** Automatically subject to EVEL without certification (Standing 
Order No. 83R).    ± Instrument withdrawn.     ± ± Not put for decision.    ± ±±  Approved after the end of the period studied.
Note: Data covers period from 23 October 2015 to 22 October 2016, unless stated.
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In October 2015 the House of Commons approved an important set of procedural 
changes, designed by the government, known as ‘English Votes for English Laws’. 
This new system has proved contentious in both political and constitutional terms, 
provoking claims that it has fundamentally altered the terms of representation at 
Westminster. But what should be made of this and other criticisms? This report results 
from a major academic investigation into EVEL. It includes detailed analysis of how 
the new procedures worked in practice during their first 12 months in operation, and 
discusses their wider constitutional implications. Based on this analysis, the report 
makes a series of constructive proposals for how EVEL could be improved.
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